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Foreword
The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA is the inaugu-
ral paper in this new publication series called Pardee Center Task Force Reports. 
It gives me great pleasure to introduce this timely and thought-provoking report 
on an issue that has immediate policy salience and on which decisions made 
today will impact longer-range development futures not only within North 
America but well beyond it.
The mission of the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study 
of the Longer-Range Future is to convene and conduct interdisciplinary, policy-
relevant, and future-oriented research that can contribute to long-term improve-
ments in the human condition. As part of fulfilling its mandate, the Pardee 
Center occasionally convenes groups of experts on pertinent policy issues with 
longer-range impacts. The Pardee Center Task Force Reports will publish the 
findings and deliberations of these groups in a format designed to speak to the 
concerns of policy-practitioners and policy-scholars. The views expressed in 
these reports always are those of the individual authors and do not represent the 
views of their home institutions, of the Pardee Center, or of Boston University.
I am delighted that we launch this series with this report on the future of trade 
policy and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Task Force 
was convened by Kevin Gallagher (Associate Professor of International Rela-
tions at Boston University and a Pardee Center Faculty Fellow), Timothy A. Wise 
(Director of Research and Policy at the Global Development and Environment 
Institute, Tufts University), and Enrique Dussel Peters (Professor of Economics at 
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). The membership of the Task 
Force includes leading experts on trade policy, and especially on NAFTA-related 
policy, from Mexico, the United States and Canada representing a variety of 
academic disciplines and policy expertise. The outcome of a stimulating meeting 
of the Task Force, held at the Pardee House at Boston University in March 2009, 
this report reflects cutting-edge ideas about the future of North American trade 
policy, including that of NAFTA. There are plans to translate this report into 
Spanish so that it can have wider circulation amongst relevant stakeholders.
There is continuing and lively discussion in the fields of economics, the envi-
ronment, development, and international relations, among others, about the 
impacts—intended and not—that regional trade agreements are having on the 
vi   
overall well-being of nations and regions. This Task Force Report comes at an 
important point in time when NAFTA countries, including the United States, are 
reviewing their trade policies and may make important decisions that have long-
term economic, social, and environmental implications for the region and the 
world. This Task Force Report is one contribution to that debate—one that comes 
from a multi-national, inter-disciplinary, and future-oriented perspective.
I am deeply grateful to all the conveners and members of the Task Force for the 
enthusiasm and hard work they have invested in this report, producing an excel-
lent document in a very short period of time. I would especially like to thank 
Prof. Kevin Gallagher, a Pardee Center Faculty Fellow, for conceiving the project, 
assembling the eminent membership of the Task Force, and leading the effort 
with his usual grace and good humor. I would also like to thank Rachel Denae 
Thrasher, a Pardee Center Research Fellow, for her hard work as a rapporteur 
and editor of this report, and Cynthia Barakatt, the Pardee Center Communica-
tions Specialist, for leading the work on conceiving and implementing this new 
publication series.
Let me end by congratulating all the Task Force members for having produced a 
timely and intellectually stimulating report that, I am sure, will make a meaning-
ful contribution to this important policy discussion, and will have long-lasting 
impacts.
Professor Adil Najam 
The Frederick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy  
Director, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future
Boston University
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executive summary
Kevin P. Gallagher* 
Timothy A. Wise 
Enrique Dussel Peters
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in  January 
of 1994. The agreement not only lowered tariffs among the countries of Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States, but also liberalized foreign investment,  services, 
intellectual property rules, and more. The agreement was intended to be a 
permanent one. Indeed, it was intended to be a stepping stone to even deeper 
integration in North America. After just 15 years, however, there have been 
broad calls to revisit NAFTA rather than use it as a springboard. Citizen groups 
and legislators in all three countries have called for major reforms to the treaty, 
and some have demanded renegotiation. In the U.S. presidential election cam-
paign in 2008, NAFTA became a lightning rod for dissatisfaction with free-trade 
policies. Since taking office, U.S. President Barack Obama has followed his 
campaign promise to revisit the agreement by initiating a comprehensive review 
of U.S. trade policies, which will include a detailed review of NAFTA.
To contribute to this review process—and the broader discussion of NAFTA as 
the prevailing template for trade agreements—Boston University’s Frederick S. 
Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future convened the inaugural 
meeting of the Pardee Center Task Force on Trade Policy in North America in 
early 2009. Chaired by Kevin P. Gallagher, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Timo-
thy A. Wise, the Task Force consists of a panel of academic experts from the 
three NAFTA countries. Its aim is not only to identify the areas that are in need 
of reform under NAFTA but to put forth concrete proposals for such reform. 
Task Force members drafted an initial set of background papers and proposals 
*We would like to thank the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future for generously 
supporting the Task Force meeting and the publication of this report. In particular we would like to thank Rachel 
Denae Thrasher, a Fellow at the Pardee Center, for her hard work as a rapporteur and editor of this report. In 
addition to the support of the Pardee Center, as research associates at the Global Development and Environment 
Institute (GDAE), Kevin Gallagher and Timothy Wise would like to thank the following foundations for supporting 
our ongoing NAFTA-related work at GDAE: the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the General Service Foundation, and the 
Moriah Fund.
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on some of NAFTA’s most important provisions.1 They were asked to identify 
needed reforms, proposing not only changes that could be made without fully 
re-opening the agreement, but also those that were more ambitious. The goal 
was to identify key reforms that could make NAFTA—and future trade agree-
ments based on the NAFTA template—the foundation for longer-run prosperity 
and equity throughout North America. 
The Task Force took as its starting points:
•	 NAFTA	has	fallen	short	of	achieving	many	of	its	own	objectives.	Rather	than	pro-
moting a convergence of incomes, wages, and standards, NAFTA has tended to 
accentuate pre-existing economic and regulatory asymmetries in North America. 
•	 NAFTA	is	in	need	of	comprehensive	reform,	as	is	the	template	for	future	trade	
agreements negotiated by North American governments. 
•	 Such	reforms	must	go	beyond	the	limited	bipartisan	agreement	reached	May	
10, 2007, in the United States. These reforms—already incorporated into the 
Peru, Panama, and Colombia agreements—principally affect the labor, envi-
ronment, and intellectual property provisions, and while they are important 
first steps, they fall far short of the comprehensive change that is needed.
To that end, this report provides detailed proposals for reforming NAFTA and 
future trade agreements based on the NAFTA experience. For future trade 
agreements, the Task Force concludes that any free trade agreement (FTA) will 
have to look sharply different than the NAFTA model, that FTAs have to be 
 accompanied by collateral regional efforts to ensure long-run sustainability and 
to overcome pre-existing asymmetries among trading partners, and finally that 
an FTA is no substitute for national economic development policies. 
i. tHe need For reForM
On paper at least, NAFTA was intended to do more than simply increase the 
flows of trade and investment. As the agreement’s preamble states, NAFTA was 
supposed to allow all three countries to:
Enhance the competitiveness of their firms in global markets; foster 
creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods, and services that 
are the subject of intellectual property rights; create new employment op-
portunities and improve working conditions and living standards in their 
respective territories; undertake each of the preceding in a manner consis-
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tent with environmental protection and conservation; preserve their flex-
ibility to safeguard the public welfare; promote sustainable development; 
strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and 
regulations; and protect, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.2
Standard economic theory was certainly on NAFTA’s side. The hope was that 
reduced trade barriers would allow North American nations to produce those 
goods and services where they were most efficient and thus accelerate trade and 
investment in the region. Such a surge in trade and investment would generate 
more employment and growth. In the long run it was hoped that the agreement 
could facilitate wage and regulatory convergence among the parties. 
After 15 years there is now widespread agreement that NAFTA fell far short 
of these goals. Rather than  triggering a convergence across the three nations, 
 NAFTA has accentuated the economic and regulatory asymmetries that had 
existed among the three countries. Since 2001, the region has actually seen a 
decline in levels of integration in key areas such as manufacturing. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the agreement has remained controversial. While pro-
ponents credit the agreement with stimulating the flow of goods, services, and 
investment among the North American countries, critics in all three countries 
argue that this has not brought improvements in the standards of living of most 
people. In the United States, the agreement is blamed for job losses, for adding 
downward pressure on wages, 
particularly in manufacturing, 
and for contributing to a large 
U.S. trade deficit. In Canada, 
critics point to job losses, the 
declining competitiveness 
of the manufacturing sector, and the constraints NAFTA has put on Canada to 
deploy adequate policies for public welfare. In Mexico, NAFTA is blamed for 
creating few new jobs while decimating many existing sources of livelihood, 
particularly in agriculture. In all three countries, citizen groups and government 
officials alike decry the rights given to foreign investors to sue governments if 
legislation has an adverse impact on their profits.
It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive review of 
NAFTA’s impacts in all three countries.3 Suffice it to say that controversy over 
NAFTA has not abated. An anti-NAFTA presidential candidate nearly won 
Rather than triggering a convergence across 
the three nations, NAFTA has accentuated 
the economic and regulatory asymmetries 
that had existed among the three countries.
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Mexico’s disputed 2006 elections. In the United States, the issue became a key 
campaign theme in the 2008 Democratic Party primaries. In the run-up to the 
primary election in the key manufacturing state of Ohio, then-candidate Barack 
Obama stated: 
I voted against CAFTA, never supported NAFTA, and will not support 
NAFTA-style trade agreements in the future. NAFTA’s shortcomings were 
evident when signed and we must now amend the agreement to fix them. 
While NAFTA gave broad rights to investors, it paid only lip service to the 
rights of labor and the importance of environmental protection.4
Since being elected to office President Obama has reiterated the need to rethink 
NAFTA and to change the template for U.S. trade agreements. Perhaps more 
important, Obama’s statements have re-invigorated constituents across the 
NAFTA countries who have long been critical of NAFTA. In addition to numer-
ous civil society efforts, in June 2009 lawmakers from Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States who represent a task force of legislators in the three countries 
calling for NAFTA renegotiation sent a letter to the NAFTA Presidents pledging 
their commitment to work for a different NAFTA. In the United States, reformers 
introduced the Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Employment Act 
(TRADE Act) of 2009 in the summer of 2009, with an initial set of more than 100 
co-sponsors from both chambers of the U.S. Congress. The TRADE Act requires a 
review of existing trade pacts, including NAFTA, and sets forth instruments that 
should be included in the template for future agreements. 
These demands for change go well beyond the so-called “May 10th agreement,” 
the concessions in 2007 won by the newly elected Democratic majority in the 
U.S. Congress from the Bush Administration to reform the labor, environmental, 
and intellectual property provisions of future trade agreements. These were 
incorporated into the pending agreements with Peru, Panama, and Colombia, 
though as of September 2009 only the first has been approved.
ii. ProPosals For reForM
In the context of this renewed debate, the Pardee Center Task Force on Trade 
Policy in North America made up of experts from Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. 
on NAFTA and its outcomes, has collectively produced this report. The Task 
Force identified three broad areas for reform: reforms that accentuate the posi-
tive aspects and mitigate the negative effects of NAFTA at the national level; 
reforms that repair NAFTA in a comprehensive manner, beyond the May 10th 
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agreement; reforms that reinvigorate regional institutions established to support 
NAFTA and to address the asymmetries among its trading partners.
Following are brief summaries of the more detailed reform proposals from Task 
Force members for the eight areas they addressed: services, manufacturing, 
agriculture, investment, intellectual property, environment, labor, and migra-
tion. These specific proposals form a comprehensive set of changes to NAFTA 
that can achieve a more prosperous and sustainable path for North American 
integration. With all three NAFTA countries facing similar economic challenges 
in the wake of the financial crisis, this is an opportune time to discuss regional 
solutions.
While each chapter is the responsibility of the member who wrote it, Task Force 
members share three broad conclusions:
1. NAFTA and the other trade agreements based on the NAFTA template 
need deep reform. These changes must go beyond the important but limited 
reforms outlined in the May 10th agreement. For NAFTA to promote prosper-
ity and sustainable economic development, the treaty needs to be re-opened. 
2. Trade agreements need to address the asymmetries among trading 
partners with supporting and well-funded institutions. NAFTA established 
some important institutions, such as the North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the North America Development 
Bank (NADBANK). However, they have been given neither the mandate nor 
the funding to allow them to help make Mexico more of an equal economic 
 partner.
3. A trade agreement is no substitute for a coherent national development 
strategy. Developing countries should learn from Mexico’s experience that 
increasing trade and foreign investment will not alone generate dynamic eco-
nomic development. 
iii. CHaPter sUMMaries:
Each chapter in this report offers specific reforms to a different part of NAFTA. 
They are summarized as follows:
services and Climate Change 
Though more attention has focused on goods than services, NAFTA’s services 
chapter is in greater need of reform. One prominent dispute (Mexican trucking) 
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and one potential dispute (Canadian tar sands oil production) highlight the ways 
in which NAFTA limits governments’ ability to regulate services trade effectively 
in areas “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or measures 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . .” Such exceptions 
are available for trade in goods, but not services, and challenges under NAFTA’s 
provisions for cross-border trade in services can undermine the efforts of nation-
al, state, and local governments to regulate in the public interest. This is par-
ticularly important now in relation to new efforts to address energy and climate 
change. NAFTA needs to be reformed to allow exceptions or broad carve-outs 
for such key policy measures; otherwise, trade disputes may deter governments 
from implementing new laws to address climate change. In addition, future trade 
agreements need to treat goods and services trade in comparable ways.
Manufacturing 
NAFTA stimulated a significant reorganization of North American manufactur-
ing, particularly in automotive, apparel, and electronics, changes that produced 
expanding trade and investment in the sector while also causing job losses that 
were inadequately addressed by trade adjustment measures. Since 2000, how-
ever, North American manufacturing has shown a competitiveness problem. The 
region as a whole has lost more than one-quarter of its manufacturing jobs, and 
the downward trend predated the current recession. The three NAFTA countries 
need to develop a new regional strategy to compete effectively with other manu-
facturing exporters, particu-
larly China. This effort needs 
to take NAFTA’s promise of 
regional integration seriously 
by expanding economic co-
operation, increasing funding 
for development in strategic industries (with help from a revitalized NADBANK), 
and allowing governments to take measures to ensure that future expansion of 
manufacturing results in more than “enclave development,” without broader 
stimulus to the economy.
agriculture 
NAFTA has had harsh socio-economic and environmental impacts in Mexico 
due to the wide development gap in agriculture between the United States 
and Mexico. The Mexican government did not take advantage of the transition 
periods built into NAFTA’s liberalization schedule, nor did it come through with 
The three NAFTA countries need to develop 
a new regional strategy to compete effec-
tively with other manufacturing exporters, 
particularly China.
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public investment in yield-enhancing projects such as irrigation. Now, Mexico 
faces high rural poverty, the loss of rural livelihoods, rising food dependency, 
and significant outmigration from rural areas. Reforms need to address contin-
ued asymmetries in agricultural development by borrowing from other trade 
negotiations. Borrowing from the WTO, Mexico needs “special and differential 
treatment” as a developing nation, with the right to designate key food crops as 
“special products” free from full liberalization and to defend itself from import 
surges with a “special safeguard mechanism.” Borrowing from European integra-
tion, a renewed NADBANK needs to invest in productivity-enhancing projects 
to stimulate agricultural development. Finally, governments need to address 
persistent market failures, such as environmental externalities from industrial-
ized agriculture and high levels of market concentration. 
investment 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment has been controversial since it was learned, 
after the treaty took effect, that it granted foreign investors the right to sue gov-
ernments for actions that are deemed by international arbitrators to be unfair, 
discriminatory, or “tantamount to expropriation” by impeding the investors’ 
rights to profit. This has resulted in a wide range of threatened and actual inves-
tor suits against governments, many for environmental or health regulations. 
NAFTA authorizes the Free Trade Commission (FTC)—made up of Cabinet-level 
representatives of each NAFTA state—to make interpretations of the treaty that 
are binding on tribunals. This is an important tool to clarify the treaty.  An FTC 
interpretation would not require reopening the agreement and could restrain 
suits against non-discriminatory measures in the public interest and establish 
investor-state arbitration as an exceptional remedy after others have been ex-
hausted. Other administrative actions could appropriately limit the discretion of 
tribunals and ensure fairer and more independent panelists with policy-related 
expertise. Some reforms, such as removing the investor-state regime from the 
treaty, require reopening the agreement. So too would reforms to the investment 
chapter’s restrictions on the limited use of capital controls, key for managing 
financial crises, and performance requirements, which have proven useful in 
stimulating technology transfer and local development.
intellectual Property 
While NAFTA’s intellectual property (IP) provisions have introduced some restric-
tions that go beyond the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Measures (TRIPs), the main problem for Mexico is not 
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NAFTA but the Mexican government’s adoption of IP rules that make it more 
difficult for innovation to be disseminated and widely used within the country. 
Mexico thus retains significant policy space within NAFTA to adopt important 
reforms, such as limiting the granting of second-use patents and reversing more 
recent reforms that restrict the use of compulsory licensing to obtain reduced 
prices on drugs. That said, some important reforms would require changes to 
NAFTA, such as allowing parallel importing of less expensive patented drugs 
from a third country, a procedure allowed under TRIPs. Finally, Mexico needs to 
strengthen local actors’ capacities for innovation, an effort that could be en-
hanced by greater regional cooperation on research and development, and also 
funding through a strengthened NADBANK or other regional institutions.
environment  
This is one of the few areas in which there is agreement to make modest 
reforms, based on the May 10th agreement in the United States and the sub-
sequent revisions of the Peru, Panama, and Colombia FTAs. Those changes—
making the environment a chapter with violations subject to full enforcement 
measures—would be an important first step, but a small one. The environmental 
damage from expanding trade in North America is large. The Mexican govern-
ment estimates the cost of environmental degradation at 10 percent of GDP 
annually. North America needs deeper reforms to NAFTA’s environmental 
provisions to ensure gradual improvement in environmental standards and en-
forcement in all three countries. It needs institutions with expanded funding to 
address chronic problems. Beyond the environment chapter, NAFTA also needs 
reforms to: its investment rules, to ensure governments have the right to demand 
transparency and environmental compliance; its IP rules to promote the transfer 
of green technologies and adequate benefit-sharing; and the services agreement 
to allow exceptions for regulations in the public interest, particularly as they 
relate to climate change.
labor  
NAFTA’s side agreement on labor, the first of its kind in a trade agreement, had 
the stated goal of promoting an upward convergence of labor standards in North 
America. There is little evidence that this happened, which is why the side 
agreement has been targeted for reform in subsequent agreements. Incorporat-
ing those reforms into NAFTA would be valuable. They recognize the Interna-
tional Labor Organization’s (ILO) core labor standards and establish enforcement 
mechanisms more likely to ensure compliance. Reforms should also strengthen 
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the funding and mandate of the Labor Commission set up by NAFTA. The United 
States could gain from improvements in Mexico’s labor standards, as researchers 
have shown that low standards contribute to trade deficits, primarily because 
rising incomes in trading partner countries create rising demand for U.S. goods.
Migration 
The promise at NAFTA’s inception was that economic prosperity would enable 
Mexico to “export goods, not people.” Yet migration from Mexico to the United 
States has more than doubled since, driven by weak job creation in Mexico 
and strong demand for migrant labor in the United States, and undeterred by 
expanding border-control measures. NAFTA liberalized trade in goods, services, 
and investment but not labor. That is unlikely to be addressed by upcoming 
reforms to NAFTA, but some measures can make a difference. The Mexican 
government needs to make job creation the top priority in its economic policies, 
with particular attention to depressed regions. Regional financial institutions, 
such as a revitalized NADBANK, must assist these efforts. Reforms to NAFTA’s 
agricultural provisions, outlined elsewhere, can slow the relatively recent flow 
from the Mexican countryside. Reforms to NAFTA’s labor rights provisions 
should include protections for the rights of migrants. Finally, the United States 
needs a comprehensive immigration reform that decriminalizes the flow of 
workers—a flow that has increased as a direct result of NAFTA-led economic 
policies.
1 The Task Force addressed the issues of services, manufacturing, agriculture, investment, intellectual property, 
environment, labor, and migration. While this is by no means a comprehensive list of the areas of the agreement 
that merit review and reform, these important areas have been the subject of significant debate since NAFTA took 
effect.
2 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992, December 17). Can.- Mex.-U.S., International Legal 
Materials, 32, 299.
3 For a good overview of NAFTA’s economic impacts, see Blecker, Robert (2003). The North American 
Economies after NAFTA: A Critical Appraisal. International Journal of Political Economy, 33(3), 5-27. For a review of 
the economic impacts of NAFTA in Mexico see the following: Moreno-Brid, Juan Carlos, and Jaime Ros (2009), 
Development and Growth in the Mexican Economy: An Historical Perspective. London: Oxford University Press. Dussel 
Peters, Enrique, Luis Miguel Galindo Paliza, Eduardo Loría and Michael Mortimore (2007). Inversión Extranjera 
Directa en México: Desempeño y Potencial. Una perspectiva macro, meso, micro y territorial. Mexico City: Siglo XXI 
and Secretaría de Economía and UNAM; and Gallagher, Kevin P., and Lyuba Zarsky (2007). The Enclave Economy: 
Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in Mexico’s Silicon Valley. Cambridge: MIT Press.
4 Ohio Conference on Fair Trade (2008, February 28). Available at: www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/ 
OCFT_%20PresPrimaryTradeQuestionnaire_Obama_022008.pdf.
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1.  naFta services and Climate Change
Robert K. Stumberg 
Six chapters of NAFTA cover services.1 For the first 15 years, the face of NAFTA 
services has been a sleep-deprived Mexican trucker. Citing safety concerns, the 
United States maintains an indefinite moratorium on Mexican long-haul truck-
ing.2 It does so despite the fact that Mexico filed—and won—the first NAFTA 
services dispute against the moratorium under chapter 12, Cross-Border Trade 
in Services.3 When Mexico finally imposed $2.4 billion in trade sanctions, 
the Obama Administration quickly announced its intent to negotiate safe and 
gradual access for Mexican trucks.4 That was in March 2009.
That was the month that Canada 
shifted the spotlight to the north-
ern border. In a bicoastal lobby-
ing campaign, Canada com-
plained that proposed climate 
measures in the U.S. Congress 
and the State of California would discriminate against distribution of crude oil (“bitu-
men”) extracted from Alberta tar sands. Canada also asserts that state renewable 
energy policies discriminate against exports of Canadian hydropower.
Other cross-border services have generated controversy about NAFTA,5 but 
trucking and energy are the cross-border services where a trade dispute—or the 
threat of one—has the power to shape major policy decisions. 
During the 2008 presidential campaign,6 candidate Barak Obama proposed to 
“amend” NAFTA.7 While recanting ambitions to reopen NAFTA’s text, his Admin-
istration is evaluating trade agreements for lessons on how to change the model 
for future agreements.8
Several lessons emerge from the trucking dispute and the energy conflict under 
chapters 6 (energy) and 12 (cross-border services). Regardless of the outcome, the 
debates provides a revealing snapshot of structural imbalance, which NAFTA 
shares with its successor free trade agreements. For purposes of national treat-
Other cross-border services have generated 
controversy about NAFTA,5 but trucking and 
energy are the cross-border services where 
a trade dispute—or the threat of one—has 
the power to shape major policy decisions. 
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ment, for example, NAFTA does not provide parallel exceptions (compared to 
goods) for measures that relate to cross-border services. In the absence of paral-
lel exceptions for health and resource conservation, a trade dispute based on ser-
vices chapters can undermine the exceptions for measures that regulate goods. 
These vulnerabilities persist in the most recent free trade agreements (FTAs). 
A similar comparison holds between NAFTA and WTO provisions on national 
treatment of services. NAFTA’s provisions on services have both broader cover-
age and more limited exceptions than the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). In cases where coverage overlaps, then, NAFTA could constrain 
the flexibility built into the WTO system. In theory, NAFTA provides mechanisms 
to preserve policy space by carving out new climate agreements and policies as 
they emerge. But by the time a policy emerges, the lines of trade conflict are al-
ready drawn. In the end, the realistic lesson is to fix NAFTA’s shortcomings by not 
repeating them. Future agreements should treat goods and services as the parallel 
sectors that they are—with parallel exceptions for legitimate policy objectives.
i. need For reForM
dual Coverage: naFta and the Wto
Mexico’s trucking sanctions remind us that NAFTA rules on services still have 
teeth. We may need reminding because a year after NAFTA took effect, the 
NAFTA countries joined a broader services agreement with global reach and 
additional trade rules, the GATS.9 Like NAFTA,10 GATS prohibits discrimination 
with rules on National Treatment and Most-Favored Nation Treatment (MFN).11 
But GATS goes farther to prohibit non-discriminatory limits on number, quantity 
or legal form of services and suppliers.12
However, the GATS eclipse of NAFTA is only partial. GATS rules apply to specific 
“committed” sectors, while NAFTA covers all sectors, with only a small number 
of measures that are excluded by the annexes.13 Although NAFTA annexes could 
exclude state and provincial measures, negotiators never completed the process 
for future measures due to  complexity and political resistance surrounding such 
measures.14
In addition to broader coverage than GATS, NAFTA provides fewer exceptions. 
A NAFTA country can defend a challenge to treatment of goods by invoking 
the general exceptions of GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or mea-
sures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . .”15
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There is some speculation that GATT exceptions might apply to other WTO 
agreements (e.g., procurement, services, subsidies, etc.).16 However, the WTO 
agreements demonstrate the intent to selectively include the same exceptions as 
GATT in some cases17 and exclude them in others.18 NAFTA explicitly incorpo-
rates GATT environmental exceptions into its energy chapter, but only for goods 
and not for services.19 
NAFTA does provide one lone exception for services: measures “necessary to 
ensure compliance” with a measure that is otherwise consistent with NAFTA.20 
However, as interpreted by the NAFTA panel in Cross-Border Trucking, the 
measure being defended must enforce “another law,” not itself.21 In addition, the 
measure being enforced must be consistent with NAFTA. That condition is not 
met if the law being enforced is the same measure being challenged.22 
dual Coverage: Goods and services
NAFTA does not define the distinction between “goods” and “services.” Instead, 
it defines goods by referring to the Harmonized Tariff System of tariff classifica-
tions. In the case of energy and petrochemical goods, that includes the product 
categories for electricity, natural and artificial gas, crude oil, specific refined pe-
troleum products, etc.23 For services, NAFTA refers to business activities such as 
transmission, distribution and storage of energy and petrochemical goods.24 As 
with other trade agreements, the question is not whether a law is covered only 
by a NAFTA chapter on goods or a chapter on services because both can apply. 
For example, California’s Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) is likely covered by 
NAFTA chapters on:
•	 Goods—which applies to “trade in goods,” and it incorporates GATT coverage 
of internal regulations “affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use . . .”25 
•	 Energy and petrochemicals—because it is a measure “relating to … basic 
petrochemical goods originating in the territory of the Parties . . . and to cross-
border trade in services associated with those goods.”26
•	 Cross-border services—because it is a measure “relating to cross-border trade 
in services.”27 
Each chapter applies to a broader scope of measures than those that directly 
regulate goods or services, respectively. A measure that regulates distribution 
services can easily “affect” trade in the goods being distributed. A measure that 
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regulates a good can also “relate to” distribution services for that good. In other 
words, a single regulation can be covered by two or more chapters of NAFTA.
One reason for the absence of service exceptions is that NAFTA provides 
alternate routes to safeguard service regulations. One was to carve them out 
of the energy chapter, as Mexico did; the other is to carve them out by list-
ing them in Annex II, which the United States could still do through nego-
tiations. The United States did not use either approach for energy or climate 
policy.
The bottom line is that even if a NAFTA country could defend a measure under 
the exceptions for trade in goods, it could lose a challenge based on national 
treatment of services. This distinction comes to life in the context of Canadian 
exports of energy services to the United States.
table 1.  Comparing naFta’s General exceptions
Goods—Selected Exceptions, 
Incorporated from GATT art. XX
Cross-Border Services
a.  Measures necessary to protect public 
 morals.
b.  Measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.
d.  Measures necessary to ensure compli-
ance with laws or regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement . . .
g.  Measures relating to the exhaustion of 
exhaustible natural resources . . .
i.  Measures essential to distribution of 
 products in short supply . . .
Measures necessary to ensure compliance with 
laws or regulations that are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement . . .
Source: NAFTA article 2101.1, which for measures that relate to trade in goods, incorporates GATT 
article XX.
ii. enerGy and CliMate serviCes
As Robert Howse and Petrus van Bork observe, “Energy is inherently dynamic 
—it is a process of transformation. The product is the process.”28 NAFTA’s 
chapter 6 requires national treatment of energy goods (like electricity and 
petroleum);29 and cross-border suppliers of energy services (like distribution 
of those goods).30 Chapter 14 covers energy-related financial services (like 
trading in carbon credits and offsets). A NAFTA country can challenge a mea-
sure that relates to distribution of goods under NAFTA chapters on goods or 
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services or both.31 This is consistent with the WTO’s interpretation that both 
GATT and GATS can cover the same measure.32
A GATS claim would give Canada the opportunity to ally with other countries, 
some of which (e.g., Venezuela and Brazil) have won WTO disputes against the 
United States.33 And like NAFTA, GATS is also lacking an exception for conserva-
tion of resources.34 But unlike NAFTA, GATS provides an exception for human 
and animal life and health.35 This exception is untested in a climate context, but 
it is theoretically available as a defense.36
Assuming that a country wants to challenge a measure based on national treat-
ment of services, the threshold question is whether the measure is covered un-
der NAFTA, GATS, or both? As noted above, NAFTA covers measures that “relate 
to” cross-border supply of energy,37 whereas GATS applies national treatment 
to measures that “affect” trade in sectors where the United States has a specific 
commitment.38 The United States has a commitment on wholesale distribution 
of goods (including petroleum products)39 and other existing and proposed com-
mitments.40 In short, there is a reasonable prospect of coverage under both GATS 
and NAFTA services chapters. 
Canada could use these services chapters to frame its discrimination argument 
against two state-level measures. While a full analysis exceeds the scope of this 
paper, two important lessons can be highlighted. First, the scope of NAFTA 
services conflict is not likely 
to be over the environmental 
objective, per se, but over how 
governments “count things 
as green” or “how green they 
are.”41 Second, neither NAFTA 
nor GATS allows a country to defend a services claim with the natural resource 
exception that applies to trade in goods. 
tar sands oil from Canada  
Canadian production of crude oil made from Alberta tar sands is projected to 
grow 158 percent between 2007 and 2015, with most of the oil to be exported to 
the United States.42 Expansion of exports above 2007 levels will require invest-
ments of $31 billion in new pipelines, mixing stations and refinery capacity, 
much of it between Alberta and refineries in Oklahoma and Texas.43
The scope of NAFTA services conflict is not 
likely to be over the environmental objective, 
per se, but over how governments “count 
things as green” or “how green they are.”
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Some of this increase will reduce dependence on “foreign” sources,44 but unfortu-
nately, tar sands crude releases three times more greenhouse gas (GHG) than con-
ventional crude oil.45 Since 2004, GHG emissions from oil extraction in Canada have 
increased 57 percent, largely from tar sands crude destined for the U.S. market.46
The government of Canada is lobbying against U.S. climate measures that might 
constrain Canada’s share of the crude oil market. These measures include a fed-
eral LCFS and border “adjustment” on the carbon content of products.47
The governments of Canada48 and Alberta49 also complain that California is de-
veloping its state-level LCFS in a way that discriminates against tar sands crude. 
The California LCFS (March 5, 2009) requires fuel suppliers to meet a carbon 
intensity standard.50 The baseline for measuring petroleum products is a “lookup 
chart,” which applies to 98 percent of the fuels sold in California in 2006, but not 
tar sands crude.51 The letters from Canada translate into a NAFTA national treat-
ment argument along the following lines:
Like service. NAFTA requires California to give Canadian fuel suppliers treat-
ment that is no less favorable than it gives, “in like circumstances,” to suppliers 
from California or elsewhere in the United States. To challenge the LCFS, Canada 
would have to establish the “likeness” of its suppliers before it could assert that 
they are being treated less favorably. On the surface at least, the LCFS rule treats 
new suppliers differently only because their production “path” is more carbon-
intensive (that is, not comparable) than the California baseline average. That 
California average was based on diverse sources of crude oil consumed in 2006, 
including heavy crude from within the state of California.52 
Canada has yet to present a services argument under NAFTA. However, Canada 
has highlighted facts that support an argument that distribution of tar-sands 
crude is a comparable “like service” to distribution of the heavy crude oil within 
California’s 2006 fuel mix.53 Distributors blend oil from many sources, and crude 
oil sources vary in carbon intensity.54 Alberta has commissioned a study to prove 
that the carbon intensity “of conventional crude oils, domestic and imported, 
is significant and in some cases comparable to heavy oil and oil sands derived 
crude.”55 In other words, Canada is likely to argue that distributing tar sands 
crude is “like” distributing the crude oils within California’s baseline with respect 
to extraction process and carbon intensity. 
Less-favorable treatment. Canada asserts that the California LCFS will treat sup-
pliers of tar sands crude less favorably. Its suppliers will have to calculate their 
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unique carbon intensity,56 which will require extensive new record keeping and 
changes in supply chain management.57 Since their oil is more carbon intensive 
than the 2006 average, they will also have to take measures such as carbon 
sequestration in order to sell into the California market (or any other state that 
adopts a similar fuel standard).58 California-based suppliers can use the baseline 
average as their measure of carbon intensity, but Canada claims that some of 
the California crude is “similar to or higher than” the GHG emissions from tar 
sands.59 Canada has not presented evidence that California heavy crude is as 
carbon-intensive as tar-sands crude. However, California’s LCFS report acknowl-
edges that 16 percent of California’s baseline oil came from sources that required 
steam extraction,60 as does oil from tar sands. In short, Canada may be able 
to prove that the state-level LCFS gives California’s dirty oil an advantage over 
Alberta’s dirty oil.61
In considering “less favorable” treatment, the NAFTA panel in Cross-Border 
Trucking reasoned that differential treatment is justified so long as it is no more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve a non-discriminatory purpose of regu-
lation.62 The NAFTA panel’s necessity test for trucking regulations sounds a lot 
like the exceptions (measures necessary to protect public morals, human health, 
etc.) that NAFTA pointedly does not provide for services. Eric Leroux observes 
that the panel’s approach is “surprising and appears unjustified and in conflict” 
with NAFTA exceptions.63
Nonetheless, even without reference to general exceptions, several GATT deci-
sions recognize that a legitimate regulatory purpose can justify differential treat-
ment of like products that compete with each other (e.g., asbestos vs. asbestos-
free insulation).64 In other words, GATT allows governments to treat products 
differently if one poses a threat the other does not, even if they are “like” in 
terms of commercial use.
Natural Resources Canada does not contest the legitimacy of California’s regula-
tory objective. Instead, it offers alternatives to the LCFS treatment of tar sands oil 
as a special case: either assign all crude oil the same carbon intensity, or “treat 
each pathway on its own merits.”65 Alberta asserts that six additional alternatives 
will meet California’s objectives.66
Exception. If Canada succeeds in proving less favorable treatment, then the 
United States would not be able to invoke the sole services exception for “mea-
sures necessary to enforce” a NAFTA-consistent measure. The measure being 
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defended must enforce another law, not itself. The California LCFS is authorized 
by state legislation, but it does not enforce another NAFTA-consistent measure, 
as the exception requires.67 Further, the measure does not meet the “consistent 
with NAFTA” test if it is the subject of the NAFTA dispute.68 
There is one more NAFTA article about exceptions that deserves mention be-
cause it is controversial in Canada. A coalition of environmental advocates is urg-
ing the Canadian government to ban extraction of tar sands oil and stop exports 
to the U.S. market.69 NAFTA article 605 says that NAFTA parties may not use the 
GATT exception for conserving exhaustible natural resources, article XX(g), to 
defend a measure that reduces exports or changes the export proportion among 
“specific energy goods” (e.g., tar sands bitumen versus conventional crude).70 
Known as the “proportionality” rule, article 605 basically says that Canada 
cannot itself try to limit exports of tar sands oil and then use the exception for 
conserving resources to defend itself in a subsequent trade dispute should the 
United States challenge the measure. As the tar sands industry builds out its 
infrastructure for expanded bitumen exports, article 605 could be a constraint 
on Canadian federal climate policy.71 It turns off a NAFTA exception for trade in 
goods, but it does not change the scenario for a services dispute simply because 
there is no services exception to turn off.
To summarize, a NAFTA panel might recognize that California’s LCFS serves a 
legitimate regulatory purpose. However, it would apply a necessity test akin to 
some exceptions in GATT article XX and GATS article XIV. “Necessity” is a more 
demanding exception than the one for measures that “relate to” conservation of 
exhaustible resources. This means the California LCFS would face a higher bur-
den of proof if the United States has to defend a NAFTA services challenge than 
a comparable challenge under GATS or NAFTA provisions on energy goods.
renewable electricity from Canada
The United States is also Canada’s customer for cross-border distribution of elec-
tricity, 96 percent of which comes from large dams (greater than 30 megawatts).72 
However, use of large hydro is excluded by Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 
which have been adopted by 28 states as a way to stimulate development of 
renewable sources. RPS obligates utilities to purchase a growing percentage of 
their electricity from renewable sources including wind, solar, geothermal, bio-
mass, and small-scale hydro (less than 30 megawatts).73 Canada’s trade ministry 
argues that state RPS laws deny national treatment.74
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Like service. Canada argues that large-scale hydro is comparable to “like” 
renewable sources that the RPS laws favor. There is a long-standing debate about 
whether renewable and nonrenewable energy are “like” products.75 However, 
a Canadian challenge of RPS would likely frame the comparison between two 
renewable service suppliers; one is included (small hydro), and one is not (large 
hydro).76 In defense, the United States could argue that large-scale hydro is ex-
cluded because it blocks salmon migration, causes sedimentation, concentrates 
toxins, and, in some boreal settings, increases GHG emissions.77 
Less-favorable treatment. The RPS laws provide less favorable treatment of 
large hydro by excluding it from the program altogether. In defense of the RPS 
programs, they treat U.S. hydro the same as they treat Canadian hydro. A NAFTA 
panel might accept the objective of protecting salmon habitat, but it might not 
accept the extraterritorial application of that objective.78 
Exception. If Canada makes its national treatment argument, the United States 
would not be able to invoke an exception. RPS programs do not enforce another 
NAFTA-consistent measure, as the exception requires.79 
iii. overarCHinG PrinCiPles and Goals For reForM
This brief review shows that NAFTA retains the power to constrain public poli-
cies in service sectors other than trucking, notably the cross-border supply of 
transportation fuels and electricity.
The overarching principle for reform is to preserve policy space, especially for 
measures that evolve beyond the status quo of 1994 when NAFTA took effect. 
Specifically, NAFTA does not provide parallel exceptions (compared to goods) for 
measures that relate to cross-border services. In the absence of parallel excep-
tions, a trade dispute based on services chapters can undermine the exceptions 
for measures that regulate goods. 
instruments for reform 
The absence of health or resource exceptions for NAFTA services chapters is a 
structural problem; it would require renegotiation of NAFTA in one of these formats:
•	 Exceptions for trade in services. For measures that regulate services, NAFTA 
could provide exceptions that parallel the ones it provides to trade in goods 
under GATT article XX, including measures necessary to protect public mor-
als, life and health, and conservation of exhaustible resources.
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•	 Exclusion of measures under Annex II. The United States did not avail itself of 
the opportunity to exclude (or “reserve”) future energy, environmental or cli-
mate measures in U.S. Annex II. It is not an accident that the energy measures 
sparking NAFTA controversy arise from new and experimental policies at the 
state level. Back in 1993, NAFTA negotiators did not complete the framework 
of exclusions that NAFTA authorizes for future state and provincial measures. 
When confronted with political resistance from some provinces and too many 
proposed exclusions from some states, the negotiators simply gave up.80 
Furthermore, in addition to state and provincial measures, In the post-NAFTA 
FTAs, the U.S. schedule to Annex II carves out measures from coverage by 
market access rules to the extent that the measure is not covered by the U.S. 
schedule of GATS commitments.81 That carve-out could be broadened to read: 
“The United States reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure that 
is consistent with U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services.” This broader language would synchronize NAFTA and GATS with 
respect to national treatment.
•	 New environmental agreement. Another way to negotiate an exception is 
to add an environmental agreement to Annex 104.1. However, the excep-
tion would be limited by a necessity test that requires implementing mea-
sures to be the least-restrictive alternative.82 On the other hand, NAFTA’s 
 proportionality rule under article 605 would not apply to measures that 
enforce an environmental agreement.83
The last option shows how myopic NAFTA is. At its inception in 1994, NAFTA 
sought to preserve policy space to implement the leading environmental agree-
ments of the day. Neither the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
nor the Kyoto Protocol existed when NAFTA was drafted in 1994.
NAFTA provides mechanisms to preserve policy space by carving out new en-
vironmental agreements and policies as they emerge. But the lesson of NAFTA 
is that by the time a new policy emerges, the lines of trade conflict are already 
drawn. The realistic lesson is to “fix” NAFTA’s shortcomings (Mr. Obama’s words 
as a candidate) by not repeating them in future agreements.84 
Future trade agreements should treat goods and services as the parallel  sectors 
that they are—with parallel exceptions for legitimate policy objectives. The 
United States should also learn from its neighbors and carve out sectors where 
policy requires experiments to evolve.
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2.  Manufacturing Competitiveness:  
toward a regional development agenda
Enrique Dussel Peters
One of the Mexican government’s goals in signing NAFTA was to expand its 
manufacturing sector by stimulating exports. In the early years following imple-
mentation, Mexico succeeded in attracting foreign investment and increasing 
manufacturing exports, with notable expansion in automotive, apparel, and 
electronics, among others. Yet this apparent success masks fundamental weak-
nesses, as the three NAFTA countries together have been losing their ability to 
compete in manufacturing in the global market. This suggests the need for a 
more proactive and long-term regional response.
Figure 1.  Manufacturing employment, naFta region:  
1990–2009/03 (2000=100)
Source: Department of Labor (United States); Statistics Canada (CANSIM); and Secretaría del Trabajo 
y Previsión Social (Mexico).
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Even before the recent global financial and economic crisis1, the manufacturing 
sectors in the NAFTA-region were under similarly extreme pressures. The share 
of manufacturing in terms of GDP and employment has been falling in the three 
NAFTA countries, particularly since 2000 (See Figure 1). Contrary to the period 
1994–2000, which saw increasing regional integration in a highly competitive 
global market, from 2000–2009 (March) the NAFTA region together lost 6.3 mil-
lion jobs in manufacturing, or 27 percent of total employment in the sector.2 
This suggests that in general, and in particular since 2000, the process of regional 
integration has deteriorated; in fact, an increasing process of “disintegration” has 
been taking place since then. These tendencies have only deepened since the 
second half of 2008 with the global crisis. In recent years, the original NAFTA 
integration agenda among the NAFTA countries has given way to one focused on 
security topics, with little sustained attention to socioeconomic, infrastructure, 
and other regional development issues.
Manufacturing is of particular relevance to both regional and NAFTA-specific 
discussions. According to a wide variety of modeling and debates during 1991–
1993, if a sector in Mexico’s economy was going to benefit through economic 
integration, it was manufacturing.3
This brief analysis is divided into three parts. Beginning with a brief analysis of 
the current conditions of Mexico’s manufacturing sector, this chapter moves on 
to discuss overarching principles and goals for an agenda toward competitive-
ness and development in the NAFTA region. The final section proposes specific 
instruments and policies to achieve those goals.
i. CUrrent Conditions in MeXiCo’s ManUFaCtUrinG seCtor
Mexico´s economy has faced severe limitations to growth since the 1980s, both 
in comparison with its own historical experience in the 1940–1970 period, as 
well as from an international comparison. From 1980 to 2007, for example, 
Mexico´s per capita GDP growth rate was one-tenth that of China. Manufacturing, 
more than any other sector, has experienced the impacts of these growth limita-
tions. Four key issues stand out as we seek to understand the current conditions 
of Mexico’s manufacturing sector.4
Falling Manufacturing 
First, Mexico´s manufacturing share in GDP has fallen constantly since the end 
of the 1980s, from levels above 23 percent to levels below 19 percent in the last 
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quarter of 2008 (and since 2001). In terms of formal permanent employment, the 
conditions have been harsher: from 1994 to March 2009 manufacturing´s share 
of total formal and permanent employment fell from 33 to 26 percent. Since 
its peak in October 2000, the sector lost 1.04 million permanent jobs through 
March 2009—or 25 percent. In the recent economic crisis, manufacturing has 
been hit particularly hard, suffering 59 percent of the country’s total employ-
ment losses from October 2008 to March 2009.
Weakening integration 
Second, the integration process within NAFTA, and concretely between Mexico 
and the United States, has been weakening steadily since 2000. From a Mexican 
perspective, the share of trade with the United States fell from levels above 86 
percent in the 1990s to 73 percent in 2008. In manufacturing the fall has been 
more substantial, with Mexico’s share of U.S. manufacturing imports dropping 
from levels above 80 percent in the 1990s to 45 percent in November 2008. 
Similarly, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd Index that calculates the percent of 
trade that is within industries, intra-industry trade (at the four-digit level of the 
Harmonized Tariff System) reached its highest level in 1998 with 48 percent and 
fell since then to levels below 43 percent. This trend is a clear indicator of declin-
ing economic integration between Mexico and the United States.
dependence on the U.s. 
Third, these tendencies have been evident in value chains that are of particular 
regional importance—yarn-textile-garments, electronics, and auto parts-automo-
biles. The current global crisis has taken a heavy toll on these industries. In au-
tomobiles, for example, it is very possible that only one or two of the Big Three 
U.S. auto companies—GM, Chrysler and Ford—will survive the crisis. Mexico´s 
auto parts-automobile industry is highly dependent on these three firms, 
since they account for almost 60 percent of total auto parts and  automobile 
 production.
new Competitiveness 
Finally, it is worth remembering that during the period 1994–2000, the imple-
mentation of NAFTA helped the auto parts-automobiles, electronics, and yarn-
textile-garments industries restructure. In both the United States and Mexico, 
this increasing integration contributed to new competitiveness in North America 
to better compete with Asia.
30   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  November 2009 The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA     31
Causes and effects
A number of factors contribute to these trends. NAFTA made the auto, electron-
ics, and garment industries more dynamic. Yet the dynamism was largely cut 
off from the broader economy because the firms in this sector tended to ignore 
Mexico as a source of inputs or markets, preferring to import the majority of its 
inputs and export the majority of its output. Thus, much of Mexico’s domestic 
manufacturing sector was hollowed out. This was a result of certain preferential 
programs in Mexico that favored importing inputs, a persistently overvalued 
exchange rate due to Mexico’s tight monetary policy, and low tariffs under 
NAFTA. NAFTA’s investment and intellectual property rules also made it difficult 
to pursue East Asian-like policies to enhance industrial competitiveness (though 
it is not clear the Mexican government would have used such policies if they had 
the space to do so). 
China’s accession to the WTO accentuated these forces. Mexico’s exchange rate 
became even more overvalued relative to competitors (China) in the U.S. market. 
These factors, in addition to the preference toward imports in national programs 
and in NAFTA, made importing all more important. More importantly, those sec-
tors that experienced dynamism from 1994 to 2000 began to lose competitive-
ness in the U.S. market with respect to China.5
Manufacturing sectors in all three NAFTA countries are in a deep crisis, a crisis 
which has been growing since the end of the 1990s. More worrisome than the 
short term is probably the medium- and long-term state of the sector in terms of 
its competitiveness in Mexico and in the U.S. market, particularly in comparison 
with China and the rest of Asia.
ii. overarCHinG PrinCiPles For a CoMPetitiveness and 
 develoPMent aGenda in tHe naFta reGion 
To face these challenges, Mexico, Canada, and the United States should start a 
new framework—either within NAFTA or beyond it—to allow for a new develop-
ment agenda to improve regional competitiveness, with an emphasis on the 
region´s manufacturing sector. Having this goal in mind, regional leaders need to 
come together to address several specific issues:
•	 The	region´s	weak	internal	dynamism	since	2000	in	terms	of	overall	socio-
economic integration, including trade, investment, migration, and regional 
patterns within the three NAFTA countries.
30   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  November 2009 The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA     31
•	 The	challenges	facing	priority	value	chains	such	as	energy,	yarn-textile-gar-
ments, electronics, infrastructure, telecommunications, transportation, agri-
culture, automobile-auto parts, and the financial and banking sector, among 
others.
•	 Each	country’s	priority	sectors,	which	vary	significantly.	From	a	Mexican	per-
spective, for example, issues such as agriculture, transportation, and migration 
are critical.
•	 The	competitiveness	of	the	three	countries	with	other	regions,	and	specifically	
with Asia and China. The three NAFTA countries today have similar socio-
economic challenges with Asia and in particular with China, not just in terms 
of increasing Asian trade and investment, but also regarding massive current 
account deficits. Thus, the NAFTA countries should envision a new North 
American regional relationship with Asia and China.
iii. sPeCiFiC instrUMents and PoliCies
The general framework for instruments and policies from a regional and NAFTA 
perspective should be one that accepts the legacy of NAFTA and focuses on 
the need to update, reframe, or go beyond NAFTA after 15 years. In addition to 
creating the policy space under the investment, intellectual property, and other 
parts of NAFTA itself discussed in this report, this is, in effect a proposal for 
a new integration and development agenda in the NAFTA region. Within this 
framework, socioeconomic topics and the issue of manufacturing’s competitive-
ness are of critical importance. They should be considered in the context of the 
first NAFTA-period (1994–2000) in which specific value chains survived and 
restructured through NAFTA.
Having this general spirit in mind, the “Development and Competitiveness 
Agenda for NAFTA´s Manufacturing Sector” should include at least the following 
policies, provisions, and instruments:
naFta development Commission 
The three NAFTA countries should engage in negotiations to establish a De-
velopment Commission that defines the depth and breadth of specific NAFTA 
reforms, much as the countries negotiated between 1991 and 1993. This NAFTA-
Commission should, in a few weeks, outline the future of regional reforms and 
delegate most of the concrete policies and provisions for the future of the de-
velopment agenda to various sub-committees. The Commission should include 
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not only officials of the public and private sectors, but also non-governmental 
organizations, academics, and experts in the respective fields. 
One of the sub-committees should address the “Competitiveness Agenda of Man-
ufacturing in the NAFTA Region” by creating panels for priority value chains, as 
discussed earlier, for example, in yarn-textiles-garments, electronics, infrastruc-
ture, telecommunications, transportation, agriculture, automobile-auto parts and 
the financial and banking sectors. Another panel should specifically discuss the 
new proposed relationship with Asia, and in particular with China.
rules of origin evaluation 
One of the main results of regional integration and negotiations during 
1991–1993 were the rules of origin, i.e., the value-added that was created in 
the NAFTA region so that the commodity was considered from the region. 
A strict evaluation of the rules of origin in manufacturing is required. This 
should consider increases or decreases in the negotiated levels in the current 
legal framework of NAFTA. For example, in the automotive sector the rules 
of origin have been important to regional development but the levels are now 
routinely ignored.
“buy north american” 
Similarly, the three countries have engaged in formal and informal programs of 
“Buy American, Buy Canadian, and Buy Mexican” during the current economic 
crisis. From a regional perspective, a “Buy North American” program could 
respond better to regional challenges and spur regional competitiveness. 
development Financing 
One of the main weaknesses of the NAFTA framework was its lack of regional 
development financing. The original NADBANK proposals called for a regional 
development bank that could address the asymmetries among the NAFTA 
countries and fund regional integration projects. The institution still exists, but 
its mandate has been significantly reduced. It should be revitalized and recapi-
talized, as others in this group have urged. Part of its broadened mandate should 
include stimulating competitiveness in North American manufacturing through 
initiatives such as support for small- and medium-sized industries, financing of 
joint venture projects, financing technological transfer, export promotion, and 
expanding domestic markets, research and development, and innovation, as 
well as public infrastructure projects. 
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All three NAFTA countries face competition issues in their manufacturing sec-
tors. If any of them is going to emerge from the current economic crisis with a 
strong manufacturing base, together they will need to devise a regional develop-
ment strategy that can reestablish the competitiveness of the sector in global 
markets that are now quite different than they were when NAFTA was negotiat-
ed. It is time for a new phase of regional cooperation to achieve a more competi-
tive manufacturing sector, which is vital to all three countries’ futures.
1 Nevertheless, the current global crisis is also a regional—NAFTA—issue, since the three countries have been 
particularly hard hit in terms of employment, GDP, and in manufacturing, and much deeper than other countries in 
Asia and Europe, for example.
2 In the period 1994–2000 all three countries increased employment in manufacturing, by 8.4% in the region, 1.4 
percent in the U.S., 23.4 percent in Canada, and 39.2 percent in Mexico.
3 For a full discussion, see: United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1992). Economy-wide model-
ing of the economic implications of a FTA with Mexico and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. Report 332–316. 
Washington, D.C.: USITC.
4 For a full analysis see: Dussel, Enrique (2009). La manufactura Mexicana: ¿opciones de recuperación? Monitor 
de la Manufactura Mexicano: proyecto conjunto de la UNAM y CANACINTRA. Mexico City: Facultad de Economía de 
UNAM. Available at: www.dusselpeters.com/40.pdf.
5 For comprehensive treatment of these factors see the following books I have coordinated or authored: Ruiz 
Durán, Clemente and Enrique Dussel Peters (1999). Dinámica regional y competitividad industrial. México: Univer-
sidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Díaz, Fernando (2001). Claroscuros: Integracion Exitosa de las Pequenas y Me-
dianas Empresas en Mexico. Enrique Dussel Peters (ed.), Mexico City: CANACINTRA-JUS-CEPAL; Dussel, Enrique 
(2000), Polarizing Mexico: The Impacto f Liberalization Strategy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers; and Dussel 
Peters, Enrique (ed.) (2007). Oportunidades en la relacion economica y comercial entre China y Mexico. CEPAL.
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3.  reforming naFta’s agricultural Provisions
Timothy A. Wise
NAFTA’s agricultural provisions have always been controversial, particularly for 
people in Mexico. Mexico’s geographically-based comparative advantages in 
supplying off-season fruits and vegetables to a hungry U.S. market were undeni-
able. Equally undeniable were the risks to Mexico’s large smallholder popula-
tion, many of whom relied on crops that competed with U.S. imports proposed 
for liberalization. NAFTA’s 
liberalization of agricultural 
trade produced the expected 
results, with staple crops 
and meats flowing south and 
seasonal fruits and vegetables 
flowing north. The problems 
relate to the social and environmental consequences of market failures that 
plague the sector and to asymmetries between the trading partners, which are 
particularly acute in agriculture. NAFTA should be reformed to guarantee a more 
sustainable and equitable plan for agricultural integration.
i. tHe need For reForM
Corn is emblematic of NAFTA’s problems. In Mexico corn (maize) is produced by 
a wide range of growers, including a small number of high-yield industrialized 
farms and some three million smallholders employing a wide range of farming 
practices and generally getting yields one-third (or less) of those of U.S. produc-
ers. Add to this already-vast asymmetry at the time of NAFTA’s implementation 
the high levels of U.S. corn subsidies and the Mexican government’s commitment 
to reduce its own extensive systems of support. When the Mexican government 
unilaterally liberalized corn markets, well ahead of NAFTA’s 14-year transition 
schedule, U.S. corn flooded the Mexican market. Over two million people have 
since left agriculture, a drop of more than 25 percent.1 With limited employ-
ment-generation elsewhere in the economy, many have added to the rising flow 
of migrant laborers.2 
The problems relate to the social and envi-
ronmental consequences of market failures 
that plague the sector and to asymmetries 
between the trading partners, which are 
particularly acute in agriculture.
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The trade flow results of NAFTA’s agricultural provisions have been entirely pre-
dictable, if accelerated by Mexico’s unilateral liberalization of most crops:
•	 Mexican	producers	increased	exports	of	fruits	and	vegetables	to	the	United	
States significantly. Exports came overwhelmingly from a small number of 
states with highly industrialized agriculture and relatively developed infra-
structure. Though there was employment growth, new jobs were limited 
in these capital-intensive production systems, except for a rise in seasonal 
employment filled by migrant labor from other parts of Mexico. 
•	 U.S.	producers	saw	some	loss	of	market	share	in	these	sectors,	though	impacts	
were limited due to the seasonal nature of most Mexican production and restric-
tions on imports during U.S. growing seasons. (Impacts were limited in sugar due 
to a long-running dispute over the treatment of U.S. corn sweetener exports.)
•	 U.S.	producers	saw	significant	increases	in	their	exports	of	maize,	soybeans,	
meats, and a variety of other staple goods.
•	 Mexican	producers	of	those	same	goods	saw	prices	fall	significantly	(50	
percent in real terms for maize) with the dramatic rise in imports. Though vul-
nerable families did not overwhelmingly abandon their farms, many entered 
or increased their participation in the migratory labor force, either seasonally 
within Mexico, permanently to growth centers in Mexico such as tourist areas, 
or permanently to the United States.
Thus the principal need for reform of NAFTA’s agricultural provisions is rooted in 
the wide development gap between the United States and Mexico in key staple 
and food crops. The Mexican government did not take advantage of the transi-
tion periods built into NAFTA’s liberalization schedule to improve the competi-
tiveness of most producers, though the largest industrialized growers received 
some assistance. Promised public investment in yield-enhancing projects such 
as irrigation never materialized, in part because Mexico’s financial crisis at the 
start of NAFTA and its bank bailout drained public coffers. But it is worth stress-
ing here that a more sensible transition period and higher levels of public invest-
ment would likely not have addressed the asymmetries between the staple-food 
sectors in Mexico and the United States.
It is critical to address these problems because job creation in Mexico has 
been disappointing and poverty remains high, particularly in rural areas, 
fueling the migratory flow to the United States. Mexico’s food dependency 
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has grown dramatically under NAFTA, and the food crisis, which sparked 
tortilla riots and protests, highlighted the fallacy that Mexico could count on 
the United States for a reliable supply of cheap food. Finally, weak regulatory 
regimes have contributed to repeated food-safety issues in highly integrated 
supply chains while providing little market oversight to prevent anti-competi-
tive business practices.
ii. overarCHinG PrinCiPles and Goals For reForM
The main goal for reforming NAFTA’s agricultural provisions is to address the 
continued asymmetries between Mexico’s agricultural systems and those of 
its NAFTA counterparts and to restore public policy flexibility, principally 
in Mexico, to allow the government to address those asymmetries and the 
many market distortions that pervade agricultural trade. Successful measures 
should lead to improved food security, declining rural poverty, reductions in 
rural migration, greater attention to the environmental impacts of agricultural 
trade, and a slow shrinking of the gaps between Mexico and its agricultural 
trading partners.
Reform measures primarily involve concessions from the governments 
of the United States and Canada. What they get in return is the long-term 
economic prosperity of one of their most important trading partners, pros-
perity that will lead to increased trade in goods, reductions in Mexico’s 
exportation of its people, and potentially reductions in social unrest and 
illegal business  activities.
iii. reCoMMended instrUMents, PoliCies, and Provisions
The reforms needed to achieve these goals are relatively straightforward but 
require political will, particularly in Mexico, to execute. Up to now, that politi-
cal will has been lacking. For example, there are steps the Mexican government 
could take without changing the substance of NAFTA, to better protect and 
develop its smallholder sector, particularly in maize. Mexico can:
•	 Justify	the	imposition	of	protective	tariffs	as	countervailing	measures	to	offset	
high U.S. farm subsidies.
•	 Expand	its	own	government	support	for	smallholders,	since	subsidies	are	not	
restricted under NAFTA and Mexico’s current support levels remain billions of 
dollars below the country’s allowable limits under the WTO.
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•	 Use	its	participation	in	the	Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety	to	restrict	imports	
from the United States, because they contain large quantities of genetically 
modified corn and Cartagena recognizes the precautionary principle.
•	 Seek	voluntary	export	restraints	from	the	United	States	on	sensitive	products	
such as white corn and beans.3
deeper reforms
To address continued asymmetries and Mexico’s need for food security and live-
lihoods, more extensive reforms to NAFTA would be required.
Borrow from the Doha Round. NAFTA countries could incorporate into the 
agreement concepts now being developed in the Doha Round of WTO negotia-
tions: special and differential treatment (SDT), special products (SP), and special 
safeguard mechanisms (SSM). 
Special and Differential Treatment—The concept of SDT recognizes asymme-
tries in development between trading partners. NAFTA incorporated few SDT 
measures, and many of those in agriculture, such as the transition periods for 
sensitive crops, were not implemented. Asymmetries remain, and they are par-
ticularly acute in agriculture. SDT can be made concrete in NAFTA’s agricultural 
provisions through:
Special Products—In the Doha negotiations, these are defined as crops of particu-
lar importance for food security, livelihoods, or rural development. At the WTO, 
much work has gone into defining criteria a country would need to meet to justify 
declaring a crop a special product. Current proposals call for granting developing 
countries the right to declare up 
to 12 percent of their agricultur-
al tariff lines special products. 
Many of the import-sensitive 
crops grown by Mexico’s small-
holders would clearly meet 
these criteria, most notably 
maize and beans, the staples 
of the Mexican diet. Farm groups have offered a minimum list of six agricultural 
products—maize, beans, milk, coffee, sugar, and meats—for SP status at the WTO. 
These and five others—wheat, sorghum, rice, eggs, and fish—are included in 
Mexico’s Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable as agricultural goods Mexico should 
Establishing a Special Product category 
within NAFTA, with clear and agreed crite-
ria for its use consistent with emerging WTO 
disciplines, would by itself address many of 
the concerns over the impacts of NAFTA in 
agriculture.
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petition the WTO for SP status. All but coffee are import-sensitive products in 
North American trade. Because NAFTA supersedes the WTO, SP exemptions at 
the WTO would be largely meaningless for Mexico. Establishing a Special Product 
category within NAFTA, with clear and agreed criteria for its use consistent with 
emerging WTO disciplines, would by itself address many of the concerns over the 
impacts of NAFTA in agriculture. The proposed U.S.–Korea FTA offers a precedent 
for flexible treatment as it excludes rice from liberalization.
Special Safeguard Mechanism—NAFTA included an emergency safeguard 
measure consistent with the principle that developing countries be permitted 
to cushion their producers from import surges. The NAFTA clause expired with 
the completion of the final phase-out of protection in the transition period. This 
needs to be amended and made more timely and effective for the party affected 
by the import surge, in line with G33 proposals at the WTO.
Borrow from European integration. Others in this project address the need 
for public investment directed primarily toward Mexico to address asymmetric 
development, as with a revitalized North American Development BANK (NAD-
BANK) with an expanded mandate and budget. Such North-South public invest-
ment certainly served the European Union well in its efforts to integrate dispa-
rate trading partners. As many have pointed out, the disparities are much greater 
in North America. The NADBANK funds have been miniscule by comparison to 
EU integration funds. Such funds would be critical to addressing asymmetries in 
agricultural development. Mexican researchers have shown that Mexico could 
more than double the country’s maize production using existing technologies 
if there were public investment in communications infrastructure, irrigation, 
credit, and agricultural extension. Most important, the water-rich areas where 
such investment makes the most sense are in the relatively underdeveloped 
southeastern parts of Mexico.4 Such poverty-reducing public investments are 
beyond the resources of the Mexican government alone. They would go a long 
way toward addressing several of the persistent market failures in the sector.
Address environmental externalities. Environmental externalities abound in 
agriculture. When more highly industrialized, high-input agricultural systems, 
with many negative externalities, are brought into direct competition through 
trade with more sustainable low-input systems, with their positive externalities, 
the effect is what has been referred to as the globalization of market failure.5 The 
management of agricultural trade needs to take such externalities into account, 
recognizing, for example, that the price of chemical-intensive U.S. corn does 
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not reflect its true costs, nor is the true value of the native Mexican maize it is 
displacing reflected in its market price.6 It is unlikely such costs and values will 
soon be incorporated into market-based pricing mechanisms. It will be impor-
tant to develop payment for environmental services schemes, backed by public 
funds, to address the problem. 
Respect precaution, protect maize biodiversity. Special measures should be 
taken to protect maize biodiversity in Mexico, the center of origin for this im-
portant global food crop. The issue of genetically modified corn is of particular 
importance and highlights both the promise and the failure of NAFTA’s envi-
ronmental regime. Through a model and inclusive citizen-petition process, the 
CEC commissioned a high-level study of GM contamination, first documented 
in Oaxaca. The wide-ranging peer-reviewed study, completed in 2003, may still 
represent the most exhaustive research into transgenic gene flow ever conduct-
ed. The findings included the clear recommendation that more precaution was 
warranted, particularly in the importation of GM corn in kernel form from the 
United States, the likely source of the contamination.7 Not only was this study 
largely suppressed due to opposition from the three governments (the papers 
still have not been published in book form), the recommendations from NAFTA’s 
environmental body have been ignored. Clearly NAFTA’s environmental institu-
tions need more teeth, a matter that is addressed in more detail by others. 
Reform related intellectual property rules. A reformed agreement should allow 
parties to exclude living organisms from patenting, permit sui generis systems 
to protect native plant varieties, require disclosure of the sources of genetic 
material used in new inventions, and observe the highest standards for consent 
and benefit-sharing. NAFTA should recognize the pre-eminence of important 
environmental treaties, as recommended in the Environment chapter of this 
document, particularly the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena 
Protocol and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Agriculture, 
known as the Law of the Seed.8
Address market concentration and commodity market speculation. Anti-
trust enforcement has been weak to non-existent in both the United States and 
Mexico. This has serious implications for agricultural markets, which were 
highly concentrated before NAFTA took effect and are even more so now. There 
is an urgent need to address competition issues in agriculture, as are measures 
to regulate speculation in commodities markets. Financial speculation gener-
ates price increases and volatility through U.S. commodity exchanges, which 
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undermine cash prices and reduce public and private investments in agriculture, 
due to the unpredictability of rate of return. Because anti-competitive business 
practices and speculation represent significant distortions to agricultural mar-
kets, government measures to correct those distortions are warranted. Again, the 
use of a more expansive and effective SSM could help address such issues in the 
absence of effective anti-trust enforcement. For example, when the full liberaliza-
tion of NAFTA’s agricultural provisions was imminent in January 2008, the large 
corn buyers that control an overwhelming share of flour markets used the threat 
of purchases in the United States to drive down producer prices at key harvest 
times in Mexico. Such uncompetitive practices need to be regulated, and govern-
ments need to be empowered to intervene.
Ideally, a tri-national body would oversee competition issues as they affect 
cross-border trade. For example, livestock operations are now highly inte-
grated, with different operations performed in different countries. Ranchers 
have long complained of anti-competitive practices, such as so-called “captive 
supply” by packers that can result in price manipulation. Regulating such 
practices is now beyond the scope of any one government, suggesting the 
need for stronger measures at the regional level. Similarly, anti-trust actions 
in response to proposed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are empowered only 
to address competition issues within each nation’s borders. Given the levels 
of integration, in agriculture and other sectors, NAFTA needs a tri-national 
body to establish clear regulations for M&A activities that may contribute to 
uncompetitive business practices.
other suggested reforms
There are many additional reforms that would improve the integration of North 
American food and agricultural markets. A few are worth noting briefly.
Grain reserves. Public food reserves are critical both to food security and to 
smoothing the price volatility that characterizes most agricultural markets. A 
well-functioning regional grain reserve for a key crop such as corn could ease 
price volatility while improving food security.
Allowing an international coffee agreement. NAFTA explicitly forbids Mexico 
from entering into any new international coffee agreement that restricts trade 
in coffee (Art. 703.3). Such international supply-management schemes should 
not be excluded by NAFTA. In fact, the recent volatility in commodities prices 
highlights their value in stabilizing markets.
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Improved food safety regulation. The lack of effective continental food safety 
and animal and plant health regulations has caused significant disruption to 
agricultural trade. The current NAFTA sanitary-phyto-sanitary (SPS) rules and the 
related consultation process are not adequate to address the underinvestment 
in SPS infrastructure, training and best practices, which has resulted in trade 
disputes. 
NAFTA has shifted agricultural trade in North America in predictable ways. The 
social and environmental consequences of those shifts are severe and should 
be addressed. Mexico remains far behind its North American counterparts in 
agricultural development. These asymmetries should have been addressed 
before liberalization proceeded, particularly in sensitive crops. They should be 
addressed now.
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4.  reforming the naFta investment regime
Gus Van Harten 
NAFTA’s investment regime should be reformed. This paper elaborates a tiered 
set of reforms that are designed to (1) encourage foreign investment, while (2) 
affording appropriate policy space for governments to develop and regulate their 
economies in a sustainable manner and (3) ensuring equitable governance of 
investment disputes such that foreign investors are not privileged, procedurally 
or substantively, over domestic investors and citizens.
The proposals have been tiered according to their feasibility, based especially on 
whether they would require an amendment of NAFTA. 
i. tHe need For reForM
investment Protection and regulation for sustainable development 
An important aim of NAFTA is to encourage and protect foreign investment 
in order to create jobs, develop the economy, and support the shift to a green 
economy. Toward this end, foreign investors are given robust protections, 
especially by the provision in NAFTA Chapter 11 for compulsory international 
arbitration to decide investor claims against governments. In various respects, 
however, NAFTA goes too 
far in favoring investors over 
other interests.
Foreign investors are pro-
tected under NAFTA by broad 
standards on expropriation, 
non-discrimination, fair and 
equitable treatment, and 
other topics. However, the past decisions of some NAFTA tribunals have inter-
preted these standards in an overly expansive, pro-investor direction. This calls 
for clarification that the treaty does not require payment of public compensation 
to investors where they are affected negatively by laws or regulations passed in 
good faith for a public purpose.1
Foreign investors are protected under 
NAFTA by broad standards on expropria-
tion, non-discrimination, fair and equitable 
treatment, and other topics. However, the 
past decisions of some NAFTA tribunals 
have interpreted these standards in an 
overly expansive, pro-investor direction.
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It is likely that governments in each NAFTA state have been influenced in their 
regulatory decisions by the risk of a NAFTA claim. Foreign investors have shown 
clearly that they will challenge virtually any government measure. For example, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 has to date been used to challenge: measures to control gaso-
line content and protect groundwater resources; a legislative ban on the export 
of hazardous wastes; a phase-out of the agricultural chemical lindane; a court 
decision leading to a large punitive damages award; the creation of an ecological 
park; the environmental assessment of a quarry project; the regulation of open-
pit mining near Native American sacred sites; and, most recently, the implemen-
tation of safety standards for foreign trucks.
Various post-NAFTA reforms appear to accept that arbitration tribunals have 
used their discretion to take investment treaties too far in favor of investors.2 
Likewise, in its review of the Metalclad award against Mexico, the British Colum-
bia Supreme Court observed with respect to the tribunal’s definition of ‘indirect 
expropriation’:
The Tribunal gave an extremely broad definition of expropriation for the 
purposes of Article 1110. In addition to the more conventional notion of 
expropriation involving a taking of property, the Tribunal held that ex-
propriation under the NAFTA includes covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, 
in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of property. This definition is sufficiently broad to in-
clude a legitimate rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning 
authority.3
Despite this, the court was unable—under the existing rules of the NAFTA 
 regime—to correct this aspect of the Metalclad award.
Concerns about regulatory Chill  
Pro-investor interpretations of indirect expropriation and other standards are 
troubling because they raise the risk of ‘regulatory chill’. They enable foreign 
investors to entangle governments in international litigation and expose them to 
costly awards, even where the government has acted in good faith in pursuit of a 
worthy objective. In the words of one lawyer, the ability to sue under an invest-
ment treaty is:
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an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a 
financial or business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided 
macroeconomic policy, or discriminatory treatment by the host govern-
ment and delighted by the opportunity to threaten the national govern-
ment with a tedious expensive arbitration.4
Various studies have raised this concern. They have highlighted the danger that 
NAFTA (and other investment treaties) frustrate government efforts to protect 
health and the environment, preserve natural resources (such as fresh water), 
counteract climate change, promote economic development, regulate utilities 
and deliver government services, make zoning decisions, reform health care, or 
regulate the financial sector.5
It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish definitively that any particular mea-
sure was abandoned as a result of a NAFTA claim. But it appears that various 
government measures have been withdrawn in the face of threatened claims. 
Documented cases include, for example, withdrawn proposals in Canada to 
require plain packaging of cigarettes, to establish public auto insurance, and to 
privatize a water filtration plant.6
Not all NAFTA claims have been successful (many are still pending). But the fact 
that they can be brought with such ease enables foreign investors to pressure 
or harass governments and to frustrate important initiatives.8 An ongoing claim 
by Dow AgroSciences against Canada, for example—in response to Quebec’s 
restrictions on cosmetic use of the chemical pesticide 2,4-D—appears aimed 
as much at deterring other governments from taking similar steps to reduce 
pesticide use for health and environmental reasons, as much as it is meant to 
win compensation of $2 million, as claimed, for the incidental impact on Dow’s 
sales in Quebec.
box 1.  the Ethyl Case7 
Perhaps the clearest case of regulatory chill is the Ethyl arbitration. Faced with a NAFTA claim, 
the Canadian government withdrew its restrictions on a gasoline additive called MMT—restrictions 
that had been justified on the precautionary basis that burning MMT posed an unacceptable risk of 
nerve and brain damage in humans and especially in children—after a NAFTA tribunal allowed the 
manufacturer of MMT to bring its claim under Chapter 11. Besides withdrawing its regulation, the 
Canadian government also agreed to (1) issue a statement that MMT did not pose a health threat and 
(2) pay (U.S.)$13 million in compensation to the manufacturer, an amount that exceeded Environment 
Canada’s annual budget for enforcement and compliance. The case indicates how NAFTA can be used 
by foreign investors to pressure a government to ‘purchase its environmental sovereignty by settling 
its way out of Chapter XI claims’.
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the threat to Financial, economic, and environmental reform
Beyond NAFTA Chapter 11, foreign investors have used investment treaties 
to bring more than 250 investor-state claims against countries, usually in the 
developing world, over the last 15 years. They have challenged a wide range of 
policies and decisions. Perhaps most ominous are the 46 claims brought against 
Argentina for its reforms in the face of the country’s financial and economic 
crisis in 2001. These claims have led to hundreds of millions of dollars in 
awards against Argentina and will likely generate billions more. Moreover, some 
tribunals have relied on dubious pro-investor readings of the treaties to support 
awards.9 In response, Argentina has declined to pay awards, thus calling into 
question the utility of the system, even for investors.10
So long as the U.S., Canada, and Mexico do not take steps to limit their ex-
posure to claims, they continue to put their public treasuries and regulatory 
processes at risk.11 Law firms specializing in investment arbitration are cur-
rently drumming up business by advising investors on how to bring investor-
state claims for losses caused by government reforms in response to the present 
financial crisis. For example, according to a client pamphlet issued recently by 
one London-based firm:
States are coming under increasing pressure to take measures to bolster 
their national economies in response to the global economic downturn. 
Whilst it may be appropriate for States to take measures to address the 
financial crisis, foreign investors could be entitled to compensation if such 
measures are taken in breach of the terms of investment treaties . . . Since 
the Argentinean crisis has similarities with the financial difficulties now 
being encountered around the world, it is instructive to see how claims 
arising from huge losses suffered at the time are now being resolved . . . 12
Useful development Measures that are specifically Prohibited
Capital controls and performance requirements are prohibited under NAFTA 
even though they can play an important role in avoiding financial crises or 
boosting productivity and employment. Tailored use of such measures should 
be facilitated based on evidence of their utility to prevent capital flows from un-
dermining financial systems or to ensure that foreign investment contributes to 
economic development. For policy coherence, the use of these measures could 
be subject to supervision by a regional commission, rather than by investor-state 
arbitration.
46   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  November 2009 The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA     47
equitable Governance of investment disputes
Investment disputes should be resolved fairly, via an independent adjudicative 
process that is accountable to public decision-makers. Investors may have good 
cause to seek protection through judicial review, even for apparently legitimate 
government action. But the 
investor-state model under 
NAFTA is overly dependent 
on a small group of arbitrators 
in its resolution of important 
matters of public policy.
For all investors, foreign or do-
mestic, protection should be 
(and usually is) provided by domestic courts. Exceptionally, back-up protection 
may be required at the international level. But international adjudication should 
be an exceptional remedy, not a first resort. Foreign investors should not be able 
to circumvent domestic courts that offer a forum for justice that is at least as fair 
and independent as investor-state arbitration. In this and other respects, foreign 
investors should not be privileged over domestic investors and citizens, who 
are also profoundly affected by government decisions, and should be entitled to 
participate in arbitration alongside investor interests.
the Privileging of Foreign investors over Citizens
Investor-state arbitration in its current form gives foreign investors the tremen-
dous power to force states to submit the decisions of their legislatures, courts, 
and administrations to intensive review and discipline by arbitrators, outside 
of any court process.13 Many disputes that can and should be resolved at the 
domestic level are thus brought before international tribunals. The system is par-
ticularly lopsided in that, while investors can claim tax-funded compensation, 
they are not themselves subject to regulation through the adjudicative process.14
the lack of independence of investor-state arbitrators
The use of arbitration to make final decisions in public law—especially where 
it involves legislative choices or public budgets—undermines judicial indepen-
dence. Arbitrators are reasonably seen to have an interest to interpret the law 
in favor of investors so as to encourage future claims and grow the arbitration 
industry. This apparent bias offers a credible explanation for the surprisingly 
pro-investor approaches of numerous tribunals (e.g., Metalclad; Pope & Talbot; 
Investors may have good cause to seek 
protection through judicial review, even for 
apparently legitimate government action. 
But the investor-state model under NAFTA is 
overly dependent on a small group of arbi-
trators in its resolution of important matters 
of public policy.
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Tecnicas; Santa Elena; Maffezini; CME; Siemens; Tokios; Occidental; CMS).15 
These tribunals have required payment of public compensation for a range of 
non-discriminatory measures where foreign investors have sustained incidental 
loss as a result of government action. Moreover, tribunals are insulated from 
review by independent judges, whether domestic or international.16
These are fundamental concerns, especially because NAFTA allows for such 
broad review of legislative and general policy decisions. Arbitrators are given 
authority that goes well beyond that of courts and tribunals under other treaties 
(other than other trade and investment agreements).
ii. overarCHinG PrinCiPles and Goals For reForM
the Principle of sustainable development
Investment treaties should allow appropriate policy space for governments 
to take action, free of the risk of a ruinous damages award, to enact laws and 
regulations on pressing issues, so long as the measure in question does not 
target foreign investors in a specific way for abuse or discrimination. This 
policy space should be widest for legislatures and courts, and for general 
policy decisions of the executive. Reforms should aim to establish a regime in 
which states have appropriate options to regulate in good faith without risk of 
international claims.
the Principle of equitable Governance
To ensure equitable governance, NAFTA adjudication must be insulated from in-
appropriate influence by investors and other private actors. The process should 
defer to the democratic legitimacy of legislatures, the independence of domestic 
courts, and the expertise of executive agencies.17 Foreign investors should not be 
allowed to circumvent domestic courts where the courts offer justice. NAFTA ar-
bitration itself should offer an independent and fair process, both for the investor 
and the state, consistent with principles of judging in the constitutional traditions 
of the NAFTA states and in international law.18
iii. reCoMMended instrUMents, PoliCies, and Provisions
Recommended reforms to NAFTA, and their key components, are summarized 
below. Notably, many of the revisions adopted in post-NAFTA treaties are based 
on the May 10th Agreement in the U.S. Congress and Administration. This post-
NAFTA position is an important starting point for NAFTA reform. For reasons 
discussed above, though, it falls short, especially because it does not address (1) 
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the danger that arbitrators will continue to interpret the treaty—however careful-
ly it is re-worded—in an unduly pro-investor way or (2) the procedural privileges 
that investor-state arbitration unfairly provides to foreign investors.
The recommended reforms are summarized as follows:
reform the dispute settlement regime
•	 consider	the	option	of	removing	the	investor-state	regime	outright	from	
NAFTA (requires amendment);
•	 provide	for	standing	in	the	process	for	persons	or	entities	whose	interests	are	
directly affected by an investor-state dispute, and allow states to bring counter-
claims against foreign investors for breaches of their own duties or obligations 
(requires amendment);
•	 establish	a	regional	adjudicative	body	to	replace	or	supplement	the	role	of	
private arbitration, and to ensure independence and enhance coherence in the 
decision-making process (requires amendment);
•	 provide	for	the	members	of	the	regional	adjudicative	body	to	develop	rules	to	
govern the resolution of investor-state disputes (requires amendment);
•	 as	a	temporary	measure	to	ensure	independence,	and	as	provided	for	in	
NAFTA Article 1124(4) itself, designate a roster of experts—preferably sitting 
judges—from which presiding arbitrators must be chosen (does not require 
amendment of the NAFTA text);
ensure that investor-state arbitration is an exceptional remedy
•	 take	steps	to	limit	forum-shopping	and	‘claims	of	convenience’	by	non-NAFTA	
investors (may not require amendment);
•	 preclude	foreign	investors	from	circumventing	domestic	courts	where	the	
courts offer justice (may not require amendment);
•	 expand	NAFTA’s	screening	mechanism	to	ensure	flexibility	and	predictability	
in key fields of regulation, such as financial regulation and health/ environ-
mental protection (requires amendment);
Clarify broadly-Framed substantive standards
•	 limit	the	concepts	of	indirect	expropriation	and	‘fair	and	equitable	treatment’	
to preclude their application to non-discriminatory measures that are adopted 
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in good faith for a public purpose, based for example on the awards in Meth-
anex19 and Glamis Gold20 (does not require amendment);
•	 clarify	that	national	treatment	requires	evidence	of	either	(1)	intentional	dis-
crimination or (2) de facto discrimination against foreign investors as a group, 
based for example on the ADF award21 (does not require amendment);
•	 clarify	that	most-favored-nation	treatment	does	not	defeat	exceptions	in	
NAFTA or extend to dispute settlement provisions of other treaties, based for 
example on the Plama award22 (does not require amendment);
Check the discretion of investor-state tribunals
•	 direct	tribunals	to	defer	to	legislative	and	judicial	decisions,	and	to	policy	deci-
sions of the executive, where the decision does not target foreign investors for 
abusive or discriminatory treatment (does not require amendment);
•	 clarify	that	tribunals	should	defer	to	the	shared	views	of	the	NAFTA	govern-
ments participating in an investor-state arbitration regarding the proper 
interpretation of NAFTA (does not require amendment);
•	 clarify	that	tribunals	may	award	partial	damages,	or	simply	a	costs	award	or	
declaratory award, as adequate satisfaction for a foreign investor, and that 
any damages award should account for the degree of blameworthiness of the 
respondent state (does not require amendment);
Provide exceptions to Protect legitimate regulation
•	 incorporate	exceptions	from	post-NAFTA	treaties	that	aim	to	safeguard	the	
financial system (may not require amendment);
•	 allow	for	tailored	use	of	capital	controls	and	performance	requirements	where	
justified to maintain financial stability or boost productivity and employment 
(requires amendment);
•	 extend	NAFTA’s	general	exceptions	to	its	investment	chapter	(requires	
 amendment);
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revise the treaty’s statement of objectives
•	 revise	the	statement	of	objectives	of	both	NAFTA	and	its	investor-state	regime	
by referring, among other things, to the equitable governance of investment 
disputes based on judicial openness, independence, and accountability (re-
quires amendment).
Not all of these reforms require amendment of NAFTA. NAFTA authorizes the 
Free Trade Commission—made up of Cabinet-level representatives of each 
NAFTA state—to make interpretations of the treaty that are binding on tribu-
nals.23 This is an important tool to clarify the treaty. That said, other reforms that 
require amendment should also be pursued in order to address key concerns.
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5.  intellectual Property for development in Mexico
Kenneth C. Shadlen
Intellectual property (IP) regimes serve dual purposes: to provide incentives for 
the generation and commercialization of innovations and to foster dissemination 
and use of knowledge. An IP regime alone cannot maximize these two objec-
tives simultaneously. After all, IP establishes incentives to innovate precisely by 
restricting use, so absent other regulations (competition policy, price controls) a 
country that establishes IP regulations that are most geared toward encouraging 
innovation potentially does so at the expense of dissemination and use of knowl-
edge. Countries have typically sought to tailor their IP regimes, setting incentives 
to achieve different objectives, in line with local capacities and to satisfy local 
needs.1
While NAFTA’s IP provisions have introduced some restrictions that go beyond 
the World Trade Organization’s TRIPs agreement, the main problem for Mexico 
is not NAFTA but the Mexican government’s adoption of IP rules that go beyond 
the agreement. These have the effect of making it more difficult for innovation to 
be disseminated and widely used within the country.
i. need For reForM
The principal problem with Mexico’s IP regime is that it is geared to promote 
innovation and the commercialization of new knowledge as if the country were 
much more developed and 
therefore capable of generat-
ing and absorbing inventions 
at a rapid pace. That is, in 
1991, prior to NAFTA (in fact 
as a precondition for begin-
ning negotiations), Mexico 
adopted a patent system that 
is appropriate for a country 
with significantly more advanced scientific, technological, and industrial infra-
structures. We can assess patent systems along three dimensions: 1) what sorts 
The principal problem with Mexico’s IP 
regime is that it is geared to promote in-
novation and the commercialization of new 
knowledge as if the country were much 
more developed and therefore capable of 
generating and absorbing inventions at a 
rapid pace.
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of knowledge can be owned as private property; 2) the rights of owners vs. users 
of property; and 3) the effective duration of property owners’ rights. In Mexico, 
the scope of patentable knowledge is broad, and patent-holders have both strong 
and long rights of exclusion. In fact, Mexico subsequently reformed the patent 
system in 2003–04 to make issuing compulsory licenses (CLs) of patented drugs 
exceedingly difficult and effectively to extend patent-holders’ periods of market 
exclusivity.2 
As simple illustrations of the mismatch between Mexico’s patent system and 
the country’s scientific and technological capacities, consider that the absolute 
number of patent applications made by residents of Mexico increased by only 4 
percent in the period since the new IP law was introduced, from 564 patents in 
1991 to 584 in 2005. In contrast, the number of non-residents’ applications tripled 
over the same time period, from 4,707 in 1991 to 13,852 in 20053. Net licensing 
and royalty payments to foreigners (payments minus receipts) increased from 
US$341 million in 1991 to US$713 million in 2004, an increase of 109 percent. 
These data suggest that the new IP system set incentives to which Mexican ac-
tors have minimal ability to exploit, while raising the cost of accessing and using 
cutting-edge knowledge. Nor does Mexico’s IP system appear to meet health 
needs. Despite significant investment in the pharmaceutical industry, the price 
of medicines in Mexico remains high, and—most importantly—the government’s 
capacity to use the IP system to leverage price reductions from patent-holding 
firms is extremely low. Patent-holding pharmaceutical firms do not fear CLs, 
and thus feel little compulsion to reduce prices. To provide one example, Abbott 
prices its patented version of lopinavir/ritonavir, a key second-line treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, more than five times higher in Mexico than in Brazil.4 
On most dimensions Mexico’s IP regime is inappropriate. The question, then, 
is how the situation could be improved. In line with the other contributors, we 
can think of responses along three lines: reforms to Mexican policy, reforms to 
NAFTA itself, and regional efforts. 
ii. reForMs to MeXiCan PoliCy
One can think of two responses to the mismatch between the IP system and the 
country’s scientific, industrial, and technological capacities: 
•	 increase	Mexico’s	level	of	scientific,	industrial,	and	technological	development	
to make it more appropriate for the new IP system; 
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•	 alter	the	IP	system	to	make	it	more	appropriate	for	Mexico’s	level	of	scientific,	
industrial, and technological development.
Mexico could do both, though in practice the focus (since early 2000s) has been 
almost exclusively on the former. Here I refer to the restructuring of science 
policy under the Fox government, the centerpiece of which were reforms to 
the operations of the National Science and Technology Counsel (CONACYT), 
the government’s most important instrument for promoting scientific research. 
These reforms included the creation of new funding mechanisms that aimed to 
increase collaboration between public research institutions and private industry. 
The government also introduced measures that involve the private sector more 
explicitly in innovation policy. For example, the Fox government created a new 
consultative forum on science and innovation to link government, academia, 
and industry; in fact, key individuals from Mexico’s most innovative firms were 
essentially “poached” by CONACYT with an eye on imparting the lessons from 
these successful innovation and IP management efforts. 
Reforms to address the innovation challenge would also take into account the in-
creasing evidence that innovation can be spurred through collaboration.5 To the 
extent that openness and sharing (rather than privatization and exclusion) are 
mechanisms for spurring innovation, policies could be introduced to encourage 
these conditions. Tax incentives can be used to reward collaborative research 
programs and “open innovation,” for example, and a greater share of CONACYT 
resources can be dedicated to promoting innovation via prizes.6 The reorder-
ing of CONACYT’s structure and operations creates a basis for moving forward 
in some of these directions, particularly to the extent that the mechanisms for 
supporting R&D in public and private enterprises can be informed by recent 
scholarship regarding collaborative innovation and the importance of extending 
the scientific commons.7 Such reforms are, in effect, more changes in effort and 
emphasis than changes in policy per se. NAFTA’s extremely broad restrictions 
on the use of performance requirements and other regulations on inward foreign 
investment eliminated a key policy tool that the Mexican government could use 
to encourage such collaboration.
These efforts also will require significantly more funding. An important implica-
tion, then, is that recognition of the importance of science and technology policy 
must become more than just rhetorical and be reflected in the Treasury’s alloca-
tion of resources. Although total (public and private) expenditure on research and 
development increased from 0.37 percent of GDP in 2000 to 0.50 percent in 2005, 
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this level is extraordinarily low. Among middle-income countries the global average 
for R&D expenditure in 2005 was 0.94 percent, while the average of high-income 
OECD countries was 2.32 percent.8 It is reasonable to expect that a revitalized and 
expanded NADBANK could contribute to such collaborative R&D spending if its 
mandate were broadened, as others have called for in this publication.
It is also important for Mexico to introduce reforms that make the IP system 
more appropriate for the country’s current level of development, because efforts 
to promote more innovation will take time to bear fruit. Until that happens, 
Mexico should:
•	 regulate	licensing	agreements	to	cap	royalties,	and	that	could	also	include	a	
firm requirement that research funded by the public sector be licensed on a 
non-exclusive basis and at low fees. 
•	 limit	the	breadth	of	patents	and	introduce	a	higher	threshold	of	novelty	and	
inventiveness as criteria for granting pharmaceutical patents.
•	 reverse	the	reforms	introduced	in	2003–04	on	compulsory	licensing	of	drugs,	
and revisit the system of linkage that was established between the patent 
 office and Health Secretariat. 
•	 introduce	a	more	flexible	and	useful	CL	system	(as	Brazil	did).
The idea behind these reforms is to keep more knowledge in the public domain 
and to facilitate public and private actors’ abilities to access and use knowledge. 
These policies would be complemented by reforms to Mexico’s competition 
laws, to prevent the abuse of monopoly rights. All of the above reforms could 
be adopted without changing NAFTA’s IP chapter, though the first would require 
changes in the investment chapter. 
iii. reForMs to naFta
The most egregious aspects of Mexico’s IP system come from how Mexico 
exceeded its NAFTA obligations. For example, the reforms to the compulsory 
licensing and drug registration arrangements were introduced a decade after 
NAFTA went into effect and were not required by NAFTA.9 
Still, in two important pharmaceutical-related areas NAFTA’s patent provisions 
do exceed those in the WTO/TRIPS, and these should be addressed. The first, 
and most simple, regards parallel importing. Parallel importation consists of 
allowing patented goods to enter the market once patent-holders have placed 
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the goods on the market elsewhere. So, for example, if the patent-holder prices 
a drug at $15/pill in Mexico and $5/pill in Bolivia, parallel importation would 
make it legal to bring them from Bolivia to Mexico.10 TRIPS allows parallel im-
porting, but NAFTA does not. 
A second area of reform regards NAFTA’s requirement that Mexico grant “pipe-
line patents.” Prior to the passage of a new patent law in 1991, Mexico did not 
grant patents on pharmaceutical products. This meant that a drug that was in-
vented in 1988, for example, was not eligible for a patent at the time it was new. 
The drug would also be ineligible for patenting in 1991, even with the introduc-
tion of pharmaceutical patents, because it was no longer new. Since drugs are 
patented before marketing authority is secured, the 1988 drug in this example 
would most likely be undergoing clinical trials in 1991—it would be in the “pipe-
line.” Not only does NAFTA obligate countries to offer “pipeline patents,” it also 
requires Mexico to adjust the terms of patents when their expiry date is adjusted 
in the original application country. Reforming the pipeline system would release 
many drugs into the public domain.11
As noted elsewhere in this report, NAFTA’s IP provisions should also allow par-
ties greater flexibility to exclude from patenting living organisms and permit 
greater protections and benefit-sharing for native plant varieties. (See Agriculture 
and Environment chapters.) 
iv. reGional resPonses
Policymakers in the three NAFTA countries should consider the creation of a 
genuine regional science and technology area—something along the lines of a 
regional R&D treaty. Elements of this could include provisions that allow Mexi-
can scientists to tap into U.S. funding (e.g., NIH) and Mexican students to have 
access to U.S. (and Canadian) doctoral fellowships. Indeed, recent research sug-
gests that international academic exchanges and linkages of this sort provide 
key boosts to innovation in developing and developed countries,12 so this could 
be a benefit to Canada as well.13 Such an agreement might also direct some 
share of the royalties and licensing fees that Mexico currently pays into a fund 
that is applied to Mexican science. A strengthened NADBANK could also help 
fund such endeavours.
Taken together, these suggestions range from reforms the Mexican government 
could undertake unilaterally to some that involve changes to NAFTA itself. They 
illustrate what needs to be done to make IP a tool for development in contempo-
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rary Mexico. If we want Mexico to become more innovative and to participate in 
and benefit from the “knowledge economy,” then it is not enough to create an IP 
system appropriate for a more developed country and wait for Mexico to grow 
into it. More pro-active steps—including at the regional level—will be essential to 
create an IP environment that is more favorable for development.
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the ones placed on the market by the patent-holder. 
11 Although both of these reforms to NAFTA would be helpful, neither are contemplated in the May 2007 agree-
ment between Congress and the USTR. It’s also worth pointing out that the reforms to the pipeline system would 
need to happen immediately to have any effect. 
12 Taylor, Mark Zachary (2009). International Linkages and National Innovation Rates: An Exploratory Probe. 
Review of Research Policy. 26(1-2), 127-149.
13 This would be similar to schemes that operate in the European Union.
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6.  naFta and the environment:  
lessons from Mexico and beyond
Kevin P. Gallagher
U.S. President Barack Obama, and the head of the Office of the United State 
Trade Representative (USTR), Ronald Kirk, have consistently committed to 
strengthening NAFTA’s environmental provisions on repeated occasions. After 
initial reluctance, Mexican President Felipe Calderon and Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper now express a willingness to revisit the environmental 
ramifications of the agreement. This short essay looks at the case of NAFTA’s 
environmental record in Mexico to highlight the need for reform beyond the 
relatively modest environmental measures included in the May 10th agreement 
and to provide specific proposals that can help NAFTA spur environmental 
sustainability across North America.
i. tHe need For reForM
NAFTA was a landmark trade agreement in terms of linking trade and environ-
ment. NAFTA was the first significant trade agreement that included environ-
mental provisions through a side agreement, and established parallel institutions 
for monitoring and finance. These achievements have been positive, but limited. 
On the one hand, the side agreement and the institutions surrounding it fostered 
an unprecedented level of tri-national environmental diplomacy and cooperation 
among parties to the agree-
ment. NAFTA’s environmental 
side agreement, “The North 
American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation,” 
created a North American 
Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation (CEC) that 
is in part overseen by a transparent and representative public advisory com-
mittee. One concrete achievement stemming from these efforts has been the 
NAFTA was the first significant trade 
 agreement that included environmental 
provisions through a side agreement, and 
established parallel institutions for monitor-
ing and finance. These achievements have 
been positive, but limited.
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establishment of a “Pollutant Release and Transfer Registry” law in Mexico that is 
broader in scope than similar laws in the U.S. and Canada.1 The CEC also boasts 
a “citizen submission” process whereby third parties can file claims identifying 
where they see violations of environmental laws in the three countries. This 
process has given rise to interesting fact-finding missions that have publicized 
coastal pollution and the genetic contamination of corn in Mexico. CEC has also 
hosted (but no longer does) an innovative funding mechanism for communities 
and small businesses to help them monitor and comply with environmental law. 
Finally, another collateral NAFTA institution of importance for the environment 
was the creation of the North American Development Bank (NADBANK) and the 
Border Environmental Cooperation Commission. These institutions fund and 
monitor water and sanitation projects in the U.S.-Mexico Border region.
In terms of environmental quality, NAFTA did not result in Mexico becoming a 
“pollution haven” for dirty U.S. firms seeking weaker environmental regulations, 
as many environmentalists feared. Indeed, in some cases foreign investment 
triggered through NAFTA brought clean technologies.2 
Unfortunately, these gains are exceptions rather than the rule. According to 
Mexican government figures, the economic costs of environmental degrada-
tion have continued to average 10 percent of GDP since NAFTA.3 Hazardous 
waste and air pollution are on the rise. Eight million tons of hazardous waste are 
generated in Mexico each year, but Mexico can only absorb one million tons per 
year. This has led to a large pile-up of hazardous waste, and to illegal waste trade 
as well.4 Biological and genetic diversity have become increasingly threatened 
under NAFTA from import floods and bio-prospecting. The expansion of export-
oriented industrial agriculture has had high environmental costs in the form of 
unsustainable water use, loading of nitrogen and other agro-chemicals.5
Mexico’s poor environment record has been due to the Mexican government’s 
lack of commitment to environmental protection in the post-NAFTA period. 
Indeed, real spending and inspection levels have all declined since NAFTA took 
effect.6 A consistent theme throughout this report is that NAFTA goes too far in 
regulating government authority. In the case of Mexico, NAFTA’s investment rules 
made it difficult for Mexico to maintain a hazardous waste site. Finally, NAFTA’s 
environmental side agreement and related institutions lack the authority to deal 
with these and other problems. In addition, they have been under-funded, rel-
egating them to the role of interesting pilot projects rather than comprehensive 
tri-national mechanisms to address environmental issues.
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ii. overarCHinG PrinCiPles and Goals For reForM
For markets to work more efficiently in the three nations, both positive and neg-
ative externalities need to be incorporated into pricing mechanisms across North 
America. Given that externalities are not included the decisions of private actors 
in the marketplace, governments are needed to act as “second-best” options for 
correcting market failures. NAFTA should afford appropriate policy space for 
governments to provide the necessary incentives to internalize externalities in 
the least trade-restrictive manner. 
Four overarching principles should guide these goals: 
•	 Polluter pays principle where those responsible for pollution pay for the 
external environmental costs of production.
•	 Precautionary principle that states that policies should account for uncertain-
ty by taking steps to avoid outcomes that could potentially cause irreversible 
damage in the future.
•	 Access and benefit sharing where the action of sharing a portion of profits 
derived from the use of biological and/or genetic resources with its original 
providers and allowing those original providers the access to the resources in 
question.
•	 Right to know where producers and governments share environmental 
 information with their populations.
iii. PoliCy reCoMMendations
Repairing NAFTA so that it can enhance environmental sustainability through-
out North America will entail revisiting some of the core components of the 
NAFTA agreement. Such reform goes well beyond the May 10th agreement 
discussed throughout this report. Consistent with the May 10th agreement how-
ever, NAFTA’s side agreement on the environment will need to be a standalone 
chapter of the agreement that adheres to the same enforcement and dispute 
mechanisms as NAFTA. Finally, NAFTA’s environmental institutions need to be 
reformed and reinvigorated. 
investment rules 
Although NAFTA did not cause foreign investors to flock to Mexico in order to 
exploit Mexico’s weaker environmental standards, many foreign investors were 
not model environmental firms when they decided to locate in Mexico. While 
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some firms brought strict environmental standards with them, others were 
quite lax and not in compliance with Mexican law.7 Furthermore, in all three 
NAFTA countries foreign firms challenged environmental laws claiming that 
such laws were “tantamount 
to expropriation,” or that 
they  were in violation of 
the “minimum standards of 
treatment” accorded to foreign 
investors under NAFTA.8 A 
reformed investment regime 
for North America needs to 
give all three governments 
the policy space to internalize 
environmental externalities 
in all firms within its borders, regardless of their national origin. In addition, 
governments and citizens should have a right to know about the environmental 
performance of all firms in their economies.
Five general improvements are needed to repair the investment chapter of the 
NAFTA:
•	 Negotiate	an	“interpretive	note”	to	reinforce	recent	NAFTA	cases	that	affirm	
how indirect expropriation and minimum standard of treatment rules cannot 
trump genuine environmental regulations that internalize externalities. This 
could be accomplished by formally recognizing the Methanex and Glamis rul-
ings under NAFTA tribunals.9
•	 Require	environmental	impact	statements	by	foreign	investors	before	locating	
in a NAFTA country. 
•	 Preserve	the	ability	of	governments	to	conduct	“pre-establishment	screening”	
whereby possible investors are screened for their environmental and other 
priorities.
•	 Grant	governments	GATT	Article	XX-like	exceptions	to	use	selective	perfor-
mance requirements to ensure that foreign firms are transferring environmen-
tal technologies and practices.
•	 Establish	“right	to	know”	provisions	whereby	citizens	and	governments	have	
access to information regarding an investor’s environmental performance.
A reformed investment regime for North 
America needs to give all three govern-
ments the policy space to internalize envi-
ronmental externalities in all firms within 
its borders, regardless of their national 
origin. In addition, governments and citi-
zens should have a right to know about the 
environmental performance of all firms in 
their economies.
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Many of these provisions have precedent under recent NAFTA cases, in the 
World Trade Organization, United States’ Preferential Trade Agreements that 
have come after NAFTA, and elsewhere. NAFTA investment tribunals in the 
Methanex and Glamis cases both affirmed that nations have the policy space for 
bona fide environmental laws. Under the WTO, foreign investors are granted no 
greater treatment than domestic investors and rules on indirect expropriation 
are absent. The “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” which were 
separately signed by Mexico, Canada, and the United States, recognize the need 
for right-to-know provisions and environmental impact statements in foreign 
firms.10 
intellectual Property rights
A reinvigorated NAFTA will need to have an intellectual property rights regime 
that recognizes the different levels of development among its parties and ensures 
that all parties can put in place systems of innovation, technology, and product 
development in an environmentally sustainable manner. Under NAFTA and sim-
ilar agreements in the hemisphere, there has been an incentive for private multi-
national firms largely located in the U.S. to monopolize domestic and traditional 
knowledge and exclude these constituents from the benefits of innovation and 
new product development. There are also increasing concerns that the current 
intellectual property regime will prohibit Mexico from developing or deploying 
new clean technologies for climate-friendly development. With respect to the 
environment, a new intellectual property regime for North America would:
•	 Require	patent	applicants	to	disclose	the	source	and	country	of	origin	of	
 genetic and biological resources.
•	 Require	patent	applicants	to	show	evidence	of	prior	informed	consent	and	
fair and equitable sharing of benefits for patents entailing the use of genetic or 
biological resources.
•	 Ensure	that	intellectual	property	rules	facilitate	the	transfer	of	clean	technolo-
gies and grant parties to the agreement equal opportunities to develop new 
clean technologies.
•	 Re-affirm	the	right	to	exclude	plants	and	animals	from	patentability	and	to	use	
sui-generis systems of protection for plant varieties.
Again, many of these provisions have precedent in the post-NAFTA World Trade 
Organization, United States’ Preferential Trade Agreements, and elsewhere. 
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Article 27.3(b) of the Trade Related Intellectual Property agreement in the WTO 
grants countries the flexibilities to exclude plant and animals for patentability 
and grants nations the flexibility to use sui-generis systems of protection on 
plant varieties, as do the current NAFTA provisions on intellectual property. In 
the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement and in the draft of the U.S.-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement both parties agreed to a side letter whereby prior informed 
consent and access and benefit sharing for genetic resources are covered. Mak-
ing commitments like these on access and benefit sharing part of the intellectual 
property chapter of NAFTA would make such provisions more enforceable and 
help alleviate some of the concerns over bio-prospecting/bio-piracy in Mexico.11 
Intellectual property rules and clean technology transfer and development are a 
relatively new concern not largely debated during NAFTA negotiations, but have 
begun to become primary concerns under the WTO. Key among those con-
cerns are the extent to which developing countries like Mexico will have to pay 
monopoly prices to install already expensive clean energy technologies and/or 
face insurmountable obstacles if they chose to develop indigenous clean energy 
technologies to adapt to and combat global climate change.12
services 
As shown in Robert Stumberg’s chapter on services and climate change in this 
report, NAFTA does not extend to the services sector the limited environmental 
coverage that can be found for goods in the agreement. The ongoing case concern-
ing Mexican trucks is emblematic of NAFTA’s services provisions running head-on 
into environmental policy. NAFTA’s services chapters may also collide with future 
efforts to deploy renewable energy and mitigate global climate change. 
To reform NAFTA’s services provisions for environmental policy, policymakers 
should provide GATT Article XX-like exceptions for trade in services. For mea-
sures that regulate services, NAFTA could provide exceptions that are neces-
sary to protect public morals, life and health, and conservation of exhaustible 
resources. Compared to goods trade, NAFTA does not provide parallel exceptions 
to national treatment for measures that relate to cross-border services. Without 
such exceptions for health and environmental policy a trade dispute based on ser-
vices chapters can undermine the exceptions for measures that regulate goods. 
environment Chapter
NAFTA was a landmark for including environmental provisions as part of the 
agreement. However, many post-NAFTA agreements have gone on to have more 
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enforcement power and to have a larger environmental scope than NAFTA. First 
and foremost, the side agreement should be enshrined as a standalone chapter 
within NAFTA and be subject to the same enforcement and dispute resolution 
parts of the agreement. With greater responsibility will be the need for a greater 
mandate and funding. 
Five general improvements are needed to create an environment chapter of the 
NAFTA:
•	 Subject	the	environmental	provisions	to	the	same	enforcement	and	dispute	
resolution provisions as commercial parts of the agreement
•	 Require	parties	to	maintain,	improve,	and	effectively	enforce	a	set	of	basic	
environmental laws and regulations
•	 Re-affirm	the	precedence	of,	and	expand	upon,	the	list	of	Multilateral	Environ-
mental Agreements (MEAs) that parties are to implement
•	 Commit	to	gradually	harmonizing	environmental	standards
•	 Expand	the	mandate	and	funding	for	the	North	American	Commission	for	
Environmental Cooperation.
The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation has been 
praised by independent assessments and by environmental organizations for 
its role in sparking tri-national initiatives on the environment under NAFTA, 
such as pollutant release and transfer registries. It has also been praised for its 
tri-partite nature that grants civil society an advisory role on how the organiza-
tion works. Most important the commission has a “citizen submissions” process 
whereby non-governmental organizations can allege failures to effectively 
enforce environmental laws. Such allegations can be followed up on by the 
commission in the form of “factual records” which have been shown to shame 
violators into compliance.13 The commission has also been criticized for its lack 
of information and data gathering, and its limited mandate for enforceability. 
However, the commission has been provided with a paltry $9 million dollar 
budget and has not been able to change the course of environmental events in 
North America.
renewed institutions for environment and development 
In order for the expanded role of environmental issues under NAFTA to work 
and be accepted, the existing mechanisms for financing environmental initia-
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tives in the region will need to be strengthened. As it stands, funding for envi-
ronmental improvements in Mexico has been on the decline since NAFTA. If 
the environmental provisions of NAFTA are seen as an unfunded mandate there 
will be great reluctance or ability on the part of the Mexican government to 
carry those provisions out. Indeed, there is some evidence that such perceptions 
persisted when NAFTA was signed, partly explaining why the environmental 
record under NAFTA has been poor in Mexico.14
The NADBANK was originally proposed by prominent economists Albert 
Fishlow, Sherman Robinson, and Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda.15 The idea was that the 
institution would serve as a regional development and adjustment assistance 
bank to help harmonize development in North America. The NADBANK was 
indeed established under NAFTA, but in the end only to address environmental 
problems in the U.S.-Mexico border. The organization was long plagued by dif-
ficulties and reformed by the Bush and Fox administrations in 2001, but only to 
strengthen its mandate to U.S.-Mexico border environmental issues.
A revitalized NADBANK would go back to its originally proposed idea of being a 
development bank and adjustment assistance facilitator, modeled after the struc-
tural funds under European economic integration and Brazil’s national develop-
ment bank, (BNDES). To that end, the NADBANK would have to be recapitalized 
by NAFTA governments and be able to sell bonds and take equity stakes in 
order to raise more funds when needed as well. In relation to the environment in 
all three NAFTA countries, a revitalized NADBANK would have to:
•	 support	small	scale,	sustainable	agriculture	initiatives.
•	 provide	loans	for	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	(SMEs)	for	innovation	
and to comply with environmental regulations.
•	 provide	loans	and	financing	support	for	public	infrastructure,	renewable	en-
ergy development, and environmental cleanup projects. 
•	 support	public-private	partnerships	for	environment-related	research	and	
development activities.
•	 develop	and	maintain	an	active	research	team	that	examines	the	environment	
and development aspects of the NAFTA countries and bank activities.
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This short essay confirms the concerns expressed by U.S. President Obama, the 
U.S. Congress, and civil society. NAFTA has clearly fallen short of enabling the 
three countries to protect their collective environment. This note also confirms 
that improving NAFTA’s ability to tackle trade-related environmental issues in 
the region will require comprehensive changes throughout the treaty, as well 
as the bolstering of existing collateral institutions for trade, environment, and 
development in North America.
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7.  rethinking labor rights
Christian E. Weller1
The promotion of greater labor rights by the United States can create a more 
level playing field and boost incomes while taking pressure off U.S. trade deficits. 
The United States for decades now has racked up large and growing trade 
deficits with the rest of the world, including Mexico, especially after passage of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. These total U.S. 
deficits—at or above 5 percent of gross domestic product since the middle of 
2004—could contribute to much lower U.S. living standards in the future since 
the United States will eventually have to repay the debt it incurred to repay 
those deficits. 
Trade between the United States and Mexico swelled under NAFTA, but con-
tradictory to the predictions by NAFTA’s proponents and standard trade theory, 
NAFTA did not produce remarkable wage gains in Mexico.2
The agreement also created imbalances among its parties. Before NAFTA went 
into effect, the United States enjoyed a small trade surplus with Mexico. In 1993, 
this trade surplus amounted to $1.7 billion. In 1994, the first year of NAFTA, 
the United States showed a 
smaller surplus of $1.3 billion, 
which quickly gave way to 
massive deficits. By 2007, the 
U.S. trade deficit with Mexico 
had soared to $75 billion. 
This is an erosion of 4,386.4 
percent in nominal terms. In comparison, the U.S. trade deficit with China only 
deteriorated by 1,024.8 percent during the same period. The U.S. competitive 
position with Mexico clearly took a beating in the years since the NAFTA went 
into effect. 
Repaying the total accumulated debt for all the U.S. deficits—at the end of 2007, 
the United States owed $2.4 trillion more to foreigners than it held in foreign 
Trade between the United States and  Mexico 
swelled under NAFTA, but contradictory 
to the predictions by NAFTA’s proponents 
and standard trade theory, NAFTA did not 
 produce remarkable wage gains in Mexico.
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assets abroad—will become increasingly costly to U.S. living standards. Default-
ing on this debt through higher inflation, which reduces the value of assets in the 
United States, or a rapidly falling currency, which debases the currency value 
of U.S. assets held by foreign investors, is unpalatable and would have serious 
adverse consequences for future U.S. economic growth. Because of these threats 
to future living standards, new public policy solutions are necessary to address 
these unsustainable deficits. 
Labor rights were addressed in the agreement, but such rights were fairly weak, 
lacked strong enforcement mechanisms, and were not met with collateral efforts 
to address labor rights in North America. Repairing these weaknesses in NAFTA 
and other U.S. trade agreements would be good for our trading partners’ income 
profile and help repair U.S. deficits.
i. tHe overarCHinG Goals oF reForM
An alternative approach to NAFTA’s ineffective labor provisions is to promote the 
creation of a global middle class. Such a strategy is not simply for the benefit of 
our trading partners, but such a middle class can buy more high-end U.S. goods 
and services. An integral part of this virtuous circle strategy is the promotion of 
enforceable labor rights, including, but not limited to, negotiating them as part of 
trade agreements, such as NAFTA. 
Better labor standards in Mexico can positively affect U.S. exports and U.S. 
imports. Better labor rights could increase demand for U.S. exports by boosting 
the incomes of Mexican workers. And, better labor standards reduce the cost 
advantage of production in Mexico since workers could no longer be paid so 
poorly. This effect should contribute to fewer U.S. imports from Mexico, assum-
ing nothing else changes. 
Labor reform in Mexico through the international relations between the United 
States and Mexico thus has three distinctive goals. First, public policy needs to 
improve the institutions that make up enforceable labor rights, such as labor 
law, courts, and independent trade unions, but also institutions that are more 
indirectly connected to labor rights, such as education. Second, policy mak-
ers should focus on raising the living standards of workers in Mexico relative 
to those in the United States. Third, to achieve increased economic stability in 
both countries, public policy needs to ensure that better worker rights in Mexico 
translate into more balanced U.S. trade. 
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box 1.  expansive labor rights for U.s. trade agreements
	 •	 Freedom	of	association	and	protection	of	the	right	to	organize.
	 •	 The	right	to	bargain	collectively.
	 •	 The	right	to	strike.
	 •	 Prohibition	of	forced	labor.
	 •	 Labor	protections	for	children	and	young	persons.
	 •	 Minimum	employment	standards.
	 •	 Elimination	of	employment	discrimination.
	 •	 Equal	pay	for	women	and	men.
	 •	 Prevention	of	occupational	injuries	and	illnesses.
	 •	 Compensation	in	cases	of	occupational	injuries	and	illnesses.
	 •	 Protection	of	migrant	workers.	
ii. labor riGHts in U.s. Free trade aGreeMents:  
tHe need to  UPdate naFta
Beginning with NAFTA, labor rights have since become an integral part of U.S. 
trade policy. NAFTA needs to be updated to include many of the improvements 
in more recent treaties, and expand upon those advances to fulfill the promise 
of higher living standards in all partner countries and to achieve more balanced 
trade between the trading partners, especially Mexico and the United States. 
The integration of labor rights into trade agreements centers on the so-called 
core labor standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as a possible 
benchmark for labor protections. In June 1998, the ILO’s members adopted the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The generally rec-
ognized core labor standards that appear in trade agreements of varying forms 
are derived from this declaration. Box 1 outlines the major labor rights that are 
found in various U.S. trade treaties that should be included in NAFTA and future 
trade agreements.
 
Under NAFTA most of these rights cannot be enforced under the agreement 
since they are part of a separate side agreement on labor. The wording of the 
labor provisions in the U.S.-Jordan FTA was not significantly different from the 
labor standards included in NAFTA, but the inclusion of the labor provisions in 
the body of the U.S.-Jordan FTA left some of these provisions subject to dispute 
settlement procedures—an added enforcement layer to the labor standards in 
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trade agreements.3 As set forth in the FTA, dispute settlement procedures lead 
the parties involved to a Dispute Settlement Panel, which produces a non-
binding report of its determinations. If the dispute remains unresolved 30 days 
after this report is presented, the affected party can take “any appropriate and 
commensurate measure,” ostensibly including sanctions.4 
Now that we have 15 years of perspective on NAFTA, the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada should reengage in dialogue about their experiences with the FTA, 
keeping a strong eye to ad-
dressing unresolved and new 
labor issues that could benefit 
all three countries. In particu-
lar, this conversation should 
include “strengthening the 
labor secretariats’ capacity to 
monitor, adjudicate, and pro-
vide technical assistance in 
respect of labor standards enforcement.”5 Ideally, this dialogue could ultimately 
lead the countries to strengthen the Labor Commission that was created as part 
of a side agreement to NAFTA. The labor side agreement should be renegotiated 
to increase funding levels, strengthen its mandate, and increase the authority of 
the Labor Commission so that it can better resolve labor rights cases.6 
iii. beyond naFta
In rethinking NAFTA, though, it is important to keep in mind a few additional 
issues. Rather than impose equivalence to U.S. law, which creates a number of 
practical problems, the United States “should support local, country-driven ap-
proaches” to developing institutions abroad that promote labor rights.”7 And, for 
real progress to be made, international agreements must contain concrete labor 
standards and a set of benchmarks to map progression over time. Past and cur-
rent signatories of trade agreements with the United States are subject to a “soft 
obligation” to the “principles” underlying the internationally recognized core labor 
standards.8 In this regard, international agreements must provide signatories with 
the tools to provide positive incentives for moving toward better labor standards, 
and negative incentives, including sanctions, when benchmarks are not met.9
This is a tall order for international engagement and unlikely to be accomplished 
with a single trade agreement, never mind a renegotiation of an existing one. 
Instead, the United States needs to broaden its engagement with Mexico and 
Now that we have 15 years of perspective 
on NAFTA, the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada should reengage in dialogue about 
their experiences with the FTA, keeping a 
strong eye to addressing unresolved and 
new labor issues that could  benefit all three 
countries.
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Canada to invest in improved labor standards in Mexico through additional 
channels. Of particular relevance can be the training and skill development 
of those involved in the actual realization of labor rights on the ground: labor 
negotiators, labor-management mediators, and labor law judges. Much of this is 
already occurring through the cooperation of U.S. labor unions and parts of the 
U.S. government, such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). 
Public policy thus should support ongoing efforts and help to increase such 
activities, where they have proven to be effective. 
In a similar vein, the United States should help strengthen Mexico’s social insur-
ance programs and promote institution building within the country. Such actions 
would help protect and promote the livelihood of Mexican workers and their 
families and enable a more attractive environment for private investment.10 This 
would also be a productive use of U.S. resources in that it would increase the 
potential for gain from a trade relationship with Mexico. 
iv. tHe iMPaCt oF better labor riGHts on U.s. trade
The reforms discussed above would boost Mexican incomes and trim the U.S. 
trade deficit. The combination of all factors that result from better labor stan-
dards point toward lower U.S. trade deficits. Exports should increase because of 
higher standards of living abroad and imports should decline as overseas pro-
ducers have to bear more of their production costs, even if part of the additional 
cost is offset by higher productivity levels. Economic theory and evidence sug-
gest that labor standards can play a role in creating more balanced international 
trade and thus should be taken seriously as part of the overall international 
economic policy agenda. 
But do these hypotheses hold in reality? An investigation of data on U.S. trade 
with a range of countries shows that U.S. trade would indeed become more bal-
anced if the United States traded more with countries with strong labor rights 
and less with countries with poor worker rights.11 
For one, the U.S. trade deficit has grown more slowly with countries that have 
stronger labor standards. Between 2000 and 2007,12 the gap between U.S. 
exports and U.S. imports widened faster for countries with limited or no labor 
rights than for countries with some or strong labor rights. 
The United States has also held smaller trade deficits with countries that have 
better labor rights. Specifically, on average U.S. exports amounted to 74.5 
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 percent of U.S. imports in countries with strong or some labor rights in 2000—in-
dicating a trade deficit—compared to an average ratio of 36.0 percent—and thus 
a larger trade deficit—for countries with limited or no labor protections. 
Moreover, trade with less industrialized countries with weak or no worker 
protections has contributed substantially to the increase in the U.S. trade deficit 
from 2000 to 2007. If the United States had just traded with less industrialized 
economies that had some or strong worker rights during those years, the trade 
deficit in 2007 would have been $123 billion smaller than it actually was. 
Furthermore, U.S. exports have tended to be greater when worker rights are 
stronger. In 2000, U.S. exports to countries with strong or some worker rights 
were 182.3 percent larger than U.S. exports to countries with limited or no 
worker rights. In 2007, the difference was 93.5 percent. The link between labor 
rights and U.S. exports remains robust in a multivariate analysis.13
Stronger labor rights have also been associated with fewer U.S. imports. U.S. im-
ports grew faster from 2000 to 2007 for countries with limited or no labor rights 
than for countries with some or strong labor rights. The link between worker 
rights and U.S. imports, though, disappears in a multivariate analysis, suggest-
ing that the descriptive analyses picked up a spurious correlation with another 
determining variable. Put differently, the primary benefit from the promotion 
of labor rights around the world, including Mexico, would arise from higher 
living standards abroad, including Mexico, and thus the potential for more U.S. 
exports. 
Are these trends large enough to matter? A simple calculation shows that the 
U.S. trade deficit would have been $123 billion smaller than it was if the United 
States had traded only with countries with some or strong worker rights. An-
other way to answer this question is to estimate a regression-based simulation. 
This analysis shows that on average, real U.S. exports would have been roughly 
three times as large if incomes and relative export prices in countries with weak 
or no worker rights had been similar to incomes and relative export prices in 
countries with some or strong worker rights. At the same time, U.S. imports 
would have largely remained unchanged if incomes and relative import prices 
in countries with weak or no worker rights had become similar to incomes and 
relative import prices in countries with some or strong worker rights. No matter 
how the data are cut, the results are robust and indicate that U.S. trade deficits 
would have been smaller if the United States had engaged more in promoting 
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worker rights. This follows primarily from higher living standards abroad that 
can contribute to more U.S. exports, while U.S. imports seem to be less impacted 
by better labor standards abroad.
1 This paper draws heavily from Weller, C. and S. Zucconi (2008). Labor Rights Can Be Good Trade Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress. It also draws on results published in Weller, C. (2009a). Could 
International Labor Rights Play a Role In U.S. Trade? PERI Working Paper. Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research 
Institute (PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
2 The discussion only focuses on the relation between the United States and Mexico since the primary concern 
arises over the U.S. trade deficit. The same arguments, though, should hold in the bilateral relationship between 
Canada and Mexico. On the other hand, it is unlikely that labor reform will change the trade relationship between 
the United States and Canada since both countries have relatively strong labor institutions, at least in the interna-
tional context. 
3 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2000). Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area. Retrieved August 6, 
2009 from USTR website: www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1041.
4 This is informally known as the ‘Jordan standard.’ Under the Bush Administration, though, a side letter was 
signed by the U.S. and Jordan in 2001 that essentially ruled out sanctions as recourse for dispute settlements. 
Subsequent reforms were made on May 10, 2007 that appeared in the U.S.-Peru agreement, leaving the first 
nine of the rights in the box enforceable. Bolle, M. J. (2003). Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues. In 
Congressional Research Service Report RL30652. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress; Elliot, K.A. (2003). Labor 
Standards and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Institute for International Economics (IIE) Working Paper No. WP 
03-7. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
5 Center for American Progress Mexico-U.S. Working Group (2009). Transcending the Rio Grande: U.S.-Mexico 
Relations Need to Reach Beyond the Border. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.
6 Ibid.
7 Samans, R. and J. Jacoby (2007). Virtuous Circle: Strengthening Broad-Based Global Progress in Living Standards. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress; Tarullo, D. (2007). A Sensible Approach to Labor Standards. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for American Progress; Barenberg, M. (2007). Labor Rights in the U.S.-Peru Agreement: One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back? (unpublished manuscript). New York, NY: Columbia Law School; USTR (2006). 
United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. Retrieved August 6, 2009 from USTR website: www.ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text.
8 Tarullo (2007).
9 Barenberg (2007).
10 Samans and Jacoby (2007).
11 All descriptive data summaries refer to the calculations presented in Weller and Zucconi (2008) and Weller, 
C. (2009b). You Can Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too: Good Worker Rights Abroad Go Hand-in-Hand with More 
Balanced U.S. Trade. Challenge (January/February).
12 All descriptive data reference the period from 2000 to 2007 since it is a complete U.S. business cycle and 
since data for earlier business cycles are incomplete. 
13 Weller (2009a).
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8.  Migration Under naFta:  
exporting Goods and People 
Rodolfo García Zamora
The promise at NAFTA’s inception was that economic prosperity would enable 
Mexico to “export goods, not people.” Yet migration from Mexico to the United 
States has more than doubled since, driven by weak job creation in Mexico 
and strong demand for migrant labor in the United States, and undeterred by 
expanding border-control 
measures. NAFTA liberalized 
trade in goods, services, and 
investment but not labor. That 
is unlikely to be addressed by 
upcoming reforms to NAFTA, 
but some measures can 
make a difference. The Mexican government needs to make job creation the top 
priority in its economic policies, with particular attention to depressed regions. 
Regional financial institutions, such as a revitalized North American Develop-
ment Bank (NADBANK), must assist these efforts. Reforms to NAFTA’s agricul-
tural provisions, outlined elsewhere, can slow the relatively recent flow from the 
Mexican countryside. Reforms to NAFTA’s labor rights provisions should include 
protections for the rights of migrants. Finally, the United States needs a compre-
hensive immigration reform that decriminalizes the flow of workers, which is 
the direct result of NAFTA-led economic policies.
i. tHe need For reForM
One of the main arguments made at the time NAFTA was proposed was that free 
trade would reduce Mexican immigration to the United States. Free trade would 
encourage investment, create jobs, increase the income of Mexicans, and bring 
about an economic convergence between the two countries which in turn would 
slow the flow of Mexicans to the United States.1 Unlike the markets for goods, 
services, and capital, however, the flow of labor was explicitly not liberalized 
under NAFTA. 
NAFTA liberalized trade in goods, services, 
and investment but not labor. That is un-
likely to be addressed by upcoming reforms 
to NAFTA, but some measures can make a 
difference. 
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The results have been clear: Mexican migration to the United States more than 
doubled, under strong labor demand in the United States and weak job creation 
in Mexico. The overwhelming majority of the migration was illegal. The U.S. gov-
ernment, particularly after September 11, 2001, increased border enforcement, 
which may have deterred some migrants but it also encouraged more of those 
who made it into the United States to stay rather than risk what had become a 
tradition of seasonal migration. Thus, rather than “exporting goods, not people,” 
Mexico exported both in rising quantities after NAFTA. 
Since the mid-1990s, migration to the United States grew steadily until 2007.2 
Between 2000 and 2006, an estimated 575,000 Mexicans emigrated each year. 
The World Bank puts the figure even higher, at 644,000.3 Calculations indicate 
that, in 2008, 12 million of Mexico’s inhabitants were residing in the United 
States, half in a situation of undocumented migration. New migration patterns 
emerged. Women comprised 45 percent of all migrants.4 An increasing number 
of migrants came from rural areas hard-hit by NAFTA’s impacts in the Mexican 
countryside. States with more limited historical migration, such as Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Guerrero, Morelos, Estado de México and Mexico City, became major 
“sending” states. Yucatán and Chiapas, from which there was very little migra-
tion until the 1980s, now have important migration networks in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area, Georgia, and Florida.
Migration between Mexico and the United States is complex, with a long history 
dating back to the end of the 19th century and with structural roots on both sides 
of the border. NAFTA accelerated the trends that have always driven Mexican 
migration: the persistent demand for Mexican labor in the agricultural, industrial, 
and service sectors of the United States; the considerable difference in salaries 
between the two economies; the demographic growth of Mexico’s working-age 
population; weak job-creation in Mexico; and strong migratory networks between 
the two countries, networks that grow stronger as migration increases.5
After NAFTA, the United States began what would become the longest economic 
expansion in the nation’s history. This kept the demand for Mexican labor high. 
Meanwhile, Mexico’s economic woes, exacerbated immediately after NAFTA 
went into effect by the peso crisis, increased the “push factors” leading to 
migration. In the 1994–95 crisis, national income contracted by 6 percent.6 The 
resulting migratory flows represent a strong indictment of the economic logic 
behind NAFTA. The criminalization of migration, and the militarization of the 
U.S.-Mexican border, continue to take a high toll on Mexican families. 
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ii. PrinCiPal areas For reForM
Political realities make it unlikely the roots of the migration problem will be 
addressed. That would require at least the partial liberalization of labor flows to 
go along with liberalized goods and capital markets. Still, important measures 
can be taken to guarantee basic human and labor rights to migrants while ad-
dressing the push factors leading Mexicans to leave their country. These have to 
do with addressing the asymmetries between Mexico and its North American 
trading partners, a long-term process that will require a long-term commitment 
of resources. 
iii. reForMs to naFta
Since migration was left out of NAFTA, the reforms to the agreement that can 
help address the issue are those that can spur economic development and job-
creation in Mexico while guaranteeing the rights of migrants. These are dis-
cussed in other parts of this document, so they are only noted here:
•	 Labor rights—The incorporation of labor rights agreed to in the ILO Conven-
tion, as per the May 10 Agreement in the United States should be extended to 
include the rights of migrants. Workers in all three countries are harmed by 
the existence of a large group with limited rights.
•	 Job creation—In manufacturing, the enclave nature of foreign investment has 
led to limited new employment. The Mexican government needs the policy 
space to direct investment in such a way that it maximizes job creation and 
ensures that foreign investment stimulates dynamic economic development in 
the areas it is most needed.
•	 Protecting farmers—Agriculture remains an important employer in Mexico, 
and NAFTA has impacted small-scale farmers severely, leading to increasing 
migration from rural areas. Mexico needs the right to protect and support 
small-scale farmers, as outlined in the Agriculture chapter of this report.
iv. reForMs to GovernMent PoliCies
The United States needs to reform its immigration policies in fundamental ways. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the complexities of the U.S. 
immigration debate. Suffice it to say that reform should lead to the decriminal-
ization of migration and to greater respect for the rights of migrants. This could 
include but should not be limited to an expanded temporary-worker program.
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The Mexican government, for its part, needs to rethink economic development 
strategy. The government should establish a coherent Migration and Develop-
ment Plan to guide public policies. The plan should prioritize social and eco-
nomic development to reduce migratory pressures.7 Such a plan would include:
•	 Regional development—The government needs to stimulate development in 
the many regions of the country that are lagging behind, areas that increas-
ingly are the source of new migrants. 
•	 Pro-growth macroeconomic policies—Mexico needs to adopt macroeconomic 
policies that stimulate growth and create new jobs. Policies in the NAFTA era 
have been overly restrictive.
•	 Policies to promote rising wages and farm incomes—The best way to stimu-
late growth in Mexico is to ensure that those at the bottom see rising incomes 
from their work. This can help overcome the yawning gaps between U.S. and 
Mexican wages and living standards, differences that contribute to migratory 
pressures.
v. reForMs to reGional institUtions
NAFTA brought together trading partners with wide disparities in economic 
development. The hope was that such asymmetries would be reduced through 
trade-led growth. That has not happened. As others in this report have stressed, 
these asymmetries need to be addressed at a regional level. Elsewhere, Robert 
Pastor, among others, has 
stressed that the migration is-
sue will not be resolved with-
out a “Marshall Plan” for de-
velopment in Mexico. He calls 
for a regional development 
fund with a ten-year program 
to address these asymmetries, 
with particular attention to 
underdeveloped regions in Mexico. While the United States and Canada would 
need to put up the vast majority of the funds, the Mexican government would 
need to carry out a long-overdue reform of its tax system to put the state in a 
stronger position to spur development.8 A revitalized NADBANK could be a good 
vehicle for such a development fund, as others in this report have argued. 
In the long run, only a regional develop-
ment framework will reduce the mass 
migration flows of Mexicans to the United 
States. If North America moves successfully 
towards a shared prosperity, there will be 
greater possibility of reaching an agreement 
regarding the ordered mobility of workers.
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In the long run, only a regional development framework will reduce the mass 
migration flows of Mexicans to the United States. If North America moves suc-
cessfully towards a shared prosperity, there will be greater possibility of reaching 
an agreement regarding the ordered mobility of workers.
1  Alba, Francisco (2008). La economía mexicana y la migración de México a Estados Unidos. Una perspectiva 
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(May–August). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM): Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas.
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